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Abstract
This thesis explores how people who have experienced cancer construct themselves in talk 
of their experience of the illness. Semi-structured interviews with six adults who had 
completed cancer treatment and were considered to be cancer free or in remission were 
analysed using a discursive psychological approach. Cancer has been characterised as being
both an acute and chronic illness. The sequelae of treatment and uncertainty over possible 
recurrence of the disease mean that there is not a discrete point at which one ceases to be 
a cancer patient. As such the challenges to identities that may arise following a cancer 
diagnosis can be considered different to those that may arise following other serious 
illnesses. Cancer also carries with it cultural associations about the culpability of the patient 
for their illness, as well as a number of culturally legitimate narratives that are centred 
around metaphors of heroic battles or journeys of self discovery. Previous research has 
suggested that disparity between the identity challenges being faced by the individual with 
cancer and the identities into which others may altercast them into can result in cancer 
patients and survivors not receiving the support that they need. The analysis revealed that 
a consistent feature of the accounts was maintaining continuity between pre- and post-
cancer identities. Where post-cancer changes were acknowledged these were assimilated 
into pre-cancer identities. Contrary to some previous research none of the participants 
oriented to the identity of being a cancer survivor. This finding is discussed in relation to 
methodological differences between the current and previous research and in relation the 
identity concerns present the participants' talk. I also discuss the constraints that discourses
of austerity politics place on the identities available to cancer survivors who find themselves
unable to work following treatment.
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Chapter 1  Introduction
The aim of this research is to explore how cancer survivors construct their identities. 
Lifetime occurrence of cancer is predicted to affect nearly 1 in 2 (47%) members of the UK 
population by 2020 (Maddams, Utley, and Møller, 2012). For certain variants of the disease 
survival has increased (Siegel, Miller, and Jemal, 2015). Improvements in detection and 
treatment, along with an ageing population, mean that the number of survivors in the UK is 
predicted to rise by one million per decade between 2010 and 2040 (Maddams, Utley, and 
Møller, 2012). 
The impetus to carry out this research came from my own experience of cancer. From the 
moment of diagnosis and throughout treatment and recovery I observed contradictions 
between our common sense understanding of cancer and my own endogenous concerns. 
Part of this common sense understanding relates to the 'privileges and obligations' (Willig, 
2011) that receiving a cancer diagnosis entails. Unlike most other illnesses a cancer 
diagnosis carries moral judgements about the culpability of the patient for their illness 
(Sontag, 1991; Mukherjee, 2011; Mitchell, 2015). Similarly, there are different cultural 
expectations about how a cancer patient should behave in comparison to other illnesses 
(Willig, 2011). Within the confines of medical establishments the cancer patient is no 
different, passively surrendering control of their body to medical professionals. Outside of 
these environs, however, the cancer patient is expected to play an active role in their 
recovery, so much so that to be recognised as not doing so is to risk opprobrium (Willig, 
2011). This active role involves being seen to fight the disease, displaying a positive 
attitude towards the illness and its treatments, and under no circumstances talking about 
the possibility of death (Willig, 2011). While the cardiac patient is expected to rest and 
recuperate, the cancer patient is conscripted into a battle against cancer's 'ruthless secret 
invasion' (Sontag, 1991:2). At a time when treatment may leave patients physically near 
inanimate, our common sense understanding of cancer is filled with vigorous metaphors of 
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battles and fighting, of victories and losses, and of journeys of self-discovery (cf. Cancer 
Research UK, 2017). This disparity between cultural expectations and the challenges faced 
by the individual with cancer has the potential to constrain the identities available to them.
Further cultural expectations are placed upon those patients for whom cancer treatment is 
successful. While their bodies may have been purged of malignant cells, cancer often 
continues to be present in their thoughts and emotions, in memories of the extreme 
experiences of treatment, and in the prospect of the disease returning. There is a cultural 
association between surviving cancer and being offered a second chance at life (Little et al, 
2002). This second chance carries with it a moral obligation to assess the life that has gone 
before and to consciously choose what kind of life is to be lived going forward (Little et al, 
2002). Those resuming their pre-illness lives and identities are expected to do so untroubled
by the everyday stresses that previously may have bothered them (Cantrell and Conte, 
2009). For those unable to, or who choose not to, resume their pre-illness lives there is an 
expectation that they will find positive meaning in the experience of cancer, accommodating
this meaning into a new version of their pre-cancer identity (Little et al, 2002). Being a 
cancer survivor can be a complicated business.
The important point here is that the privileges and obligations outlined above are part of our
common sense understanding of cancer, culturally available knowledge that we share 
through talk and texts. They are part of the discourses of what it means to be a cancer 
patient or a cancer survivor, 'systematically form[ing] the objects of which they speak' 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 49). Amongst those objects are both the illness1 itself and the 
subjectivities available to the individual living with or after that illness. Within a social 
constructionist theoretical framework these discourses and the subjectivities or identities 
available within them are constituted in everyday talk (Burr, 2015). 
1 I discuss the differences between sickness, illness, and disease in Chapter 2 along with 
the social construction of illness.
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Understanding how people who have experienced cancer construct themselves in talk of 
that experience offers an insight into the identity challenges that experience of the disease 
may present. Identity challenges are not limited to the existential threat of the disease but 
are also presented by embodied changes that may preclude roles or activities that 
previously contributed to one's identity. Disparity between who the cancer survivor 
considers themselves to be and who their social and support networks consider them to be 
has been shown to lead to survivors compromising on the support they receive (Miller, 
2015). This compromise arises due to a need to manage the competing communication 
goals of maintaining consensus with those around us and articulating the challenges being 
faced by the individual. Understanding the identity challenges that the individual is facing 
may not only facilitate better communication but also ensure appropriate support. Drawing 
on a Discourse Analytic approach that focuses on the action orientation of everyday talk, I 
examine what social actions people accomplish by constructing themselves in a particular 
way. I also explore how individuals position themselves within the dominant discourses of 
what it means to be a cancer patient or survivor as they construct their identities.
In Chapter 2 I review the relevant psychological literature relating to the social construction 
of illness, cancer, and the identity challenges that cancer may present. In Chapter 3 I 
outline the ontological and epistemological assumptions of a social constructionist approach 
and differing approaches to discourse analysis before describing the discursive psychological
approach and analytical process that I have drawn upon. I present my analytical findings in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Each chapter assumes a different analytical lens, focusing on one 
aspect of identity rather than describing discrete processes or features of identity 
construction. In Chapter 7 I consider my findings in relation to previous research and 
discuss future areas of research along with some of the challenges and benefits of the 
methodological process I have used.
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Chapter 2  A review of the literature
Introduction
Within this chapter I review the psychological literature relating to cancer, specifically in 
terms of how our common sense understanding of the disease makes available specific 
ways of being for the individual diagnosed with the disease (Willig, 2011). I begin by 
outlining the social construction of illness or the lived experience of a disease, and how such
experience is shaped by the historical and cultural context in which it occurs. Much of our 
common sense talk of cancer draws upon metaphor. As such I offer a review of the 
literature related to the two dominant metaphors pertaining to cancer, those of the battle 
metaphor and the metaphor of cancer as a journey. I provide an overview of the literature 
related to cancer survivorship and the identity challenges faced by individuals for whom 
treatment is successful. I conclude the chapter by introducing my research question and 
highlighting how this research aims to extend our understanding of the identity challenges 
faced by cancer survivors.
2.1 The social construction of illness 
In contrast to the medical model of illness, which assumes the universal and invariant 
nature of disease, a social constructionist theoretical framework conceptualises the 
experience of illness as being shaped by cultural and social systems. Radley (1994) 
described three distinct components to how illness is conceptualised in industrialised 
Western societies: Disease, Sickness, and Illness. Disease refers to a biological condition 
and its associated pathological symptoms. Medical doctors make diagnoses based on 
interpretations of such symptoms, yet these diagnoses and classifications of what 
constitutes a disease (or abnormal health) have changed across historical and cultural 
contexts (Foucault, 1988) and as such are neither universal, invariant, nor free of cultural 
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influences. Radley conceptualised Sickness as the patient being assigned temporary 
reprieve from their usual social obligations, such as working or caring for others. He argued 
that people are allowed to adopt 'the sick role' as long as cultural expectations of illness, 
such as promptly seeking and accepting treatment from a medical doctor, are met. The 
cultural expectations placed upon the person in the sick role extend from their immediate 
social circle to their employers, government policies and even employment law. The third 
component that Radley described is Illness, or the lived experience of a disease. How an 
illness is experienced is not only influenced by physical symptoms and any limitations that 
they bring to bear but also by the meaning that the sufferer confers upon their condition, 
how it impacts upon cultural norms of expected behaviour, and how others conceptualise 
both the illness and person suffering from it (Conrad and Barker, 2010). Some illnesses, 
such as Myalgic Encephalomyelitis (M.E.), may be contested and viewed by some as not 
being an illness at all (Horton-Salway, 2001). Some illnesses are considered disabilities 
while others are not (Conrad and Barker, 2010), while yet other illnesses such as HIV/AIDS 
are stigmatised with moral judgements against a particular lifestyle, personality type, or 
presumed culpable behaviour (Sontag, 1991).
2.2 Cancer metaphors
Much of our common sense understanding of cancer draws upon metaphors. Lakoff and 
Johnson suggested that 'the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one 
kind of thing in terms of another' (1980:5). They argued that our use of metaphor extends 
beyond adding a 'rhetorical flourish' to language and that it influences how we conceptualise
the world. For example, the metaphor of argument as war conceptualises arguments as an 
adversarial practice that results in a winner and a loser. The goal of such an endeavour is to
destroy your opponent's argument, targeting the weak points in their argument and 
shooting them down. In other words, the metaphor guides behavioural norms. Within Lakoff
and Johnson's Cognitive Metaphor Theory metaphor shapes our thoughts and these 
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thoughts are reflected in our language. In contrast, within a discursive psychological 
approach metaphors are discursive resources that we draw upon to shape arguments that 
are constructed to achieve specific social actions. For example, the metaphor of immigration
as a cancer that threatens our national identity carries 'social, emotional and aesthetic 
values that influence the interpretation of the utterance' (Musolff, 2012:303). Couching 
immigration in such a way side steps having to offer justification for being anti-immigration.
Instead, the listener is invited to draw upon their knowledge about the undesirability of 
cancer, the existential threat that it presents, and the necessity of seeking treatment 
(Musolff, 2012). While cancer is often used as a metaphor for any undesirable state of 
affairs, in relation to the disease itself two metaphors dominate our common sense 
understanding of it: the battle metaphor and the journey metaphor.
The Battle Metaphor
Mukherjee (2011) chronicled the introduction of the idea of a war on cancer as an 
awareness and fundraising initiative in 1950s America. More than half a century later the 
notion of a war on cancer and the associated battle metaphor have persisted in the face of 
ongoing criticism from medical doctors (McCartney, 2014), psychologists (Hurley, 2014), 
cancer patients and those who find themselves spanning multiple categories such as doctor 
and cancer patient (Granger, 2014) or psychologist and cancer patient (Willig, 2011). Critics
of the battle metaphor have argued that it is particularly harmful when treatment fails, 
painting a negative picture of those who succumb to the disease as not having fought hard 
enough (Demmen, Semino, Demjén, Koller, Hardie, Rayson, & Payne, 2015) and 
stigmatising their memories for surviving relatives (Hurley, 2014). Others have criticised the
battle metaphor for the negative connotations of toxic or debilitating treatments fighting the
patient (Semino, Demjén, Demmen, Koller, Payne, Hardie, & Rayson, 2015) and the 
constraints that it may place on patients expressing their emotions. By positioning the 
patient as fighting their disease emotions such as fear or sadness may be suppressed due to
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the cultural expectation that one must always display a positive, fighting spirit (McCartney, 
2014). This expectation of displaying a positive spirit has been characterised as the 'tyranny
of positive thinking' (Penson, Schapira, Daniels, Chabner, and Lynch, 2004:711). Similarly, 
there is a belief that bad things will happen to those who do not express a positive attitude 
(see Ehrenreich, 2009, for a critique of positive thinking in breast cancer culture). Contrary 
to such beliefs, no association between a fighting coping style and survival rates has been 
identified (Petticrew, Bell, and Hunter, 2002; McCartney, 2014).
The negative impact of the battle metaphor is not limited to the cancer patient. Hauser and 
Schwartz (2015) have argued that bellicose cancer metaphors, which conceptualise cancer 
as an enemy, may reduce the uptake of some cancer prevention behaviours. This is 
because preventative behaviours often involve avoidance or reductions in cancer-related 
activities such as smoking or prolonged exposure to direct sunlight. Such self-limitation or 
avoidance is not synonymous with fighting or battling the enemy head on.
Contrary to the criticisms outlined above, other researchers have argued that whether the 
battle metaphor is empowering or disempowering is context specific. Semino et al (2015) 
reported that violence metaphors employed in an online cancer forum were used in an 
empowering manner by patients when treatment was working, when patients had 
successfully fought (against their doctors) to be given specific drugs, and when patients 
talked with other patients in mutually supportive terms about their battles against a 
common enemy. Penson et al (2004) highlighted that medical professionals often prefer to 
work with the metaphors that come from the patients themselves, whether they be 
militaristic, sporting, or idiosyncratic. Such metaphors can provide a common language 
between doctors, who tend to conceptualise cancer as a disease described in technical 
terminology, and patients who are conceptualising their illness as a threat to their mortality 
or their sense of who they are (Charmaz, 1994).
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Metaphors such as the battle metaphor not only have a representational function of 
rendering past experiences and constructing a portrayal of one's current circumstances, 
they also have a determinative function (Gibbs and Franks, 2002). The use of metaphors 
allows people to 'project their futures' in terms that empower them as they confront what 
Hurley called 'society's paradox' of marching 'towards uncertainty, towards death rather 
than deny[ing] it' (2014:313). Hurley suggested that the persistence of the battle metaphor
may be influenced by the need of those who survive the death of a loved one to 'honour a 
fallen hero' and by being 'shaken at seeing up close that life is ultimately not controllable' 
(2014:314). She also argued that it offers doctors an object towards which they may direct 
negative feelings about the toxic treatments they deliver to patients and the frequent losses
associated with cancer treatment. However, both of these ideas conflict with the findings of 
a study by Demmen et al (2015) who reported that family carers rarely used fighting 
metaphors, and no battle metaphors at all, when talking about the illness and treatment of 
their loved ones, and that medical professionals used 'protect' and 'confront' metaphors in 
discussions with patients rather than using the battle metaphor. Similarly in a study by 
Gibbs and Franks (2002) the metaphors used by women suffering from cancer were often 
no different to the embodied metaphors used by people in good health. Given the 
pervasiveness of metaphor within our everyday talk perhaps this is not surprising. Tropes 
such as 'it was a battle to find a parking space' are arguably so commonplace as to have 
lost their militaristic associations. This same ubiquity applies to the second metaphor that I 
wish to review, that of 'cancer as a journey'.
The Journey Metaphor
The 2007 National Health Service (NHS) Cancer Reform Strategy abandoned using battle 
metaphors in favour of talking about cancer as a journey, with different models of care 
portrayed as different pathways and the implication that cancer is a travelling companion 
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(Semino et al, 2015). The journey metaphor avoids the negative implications associated 
with 'losing the fight' against cancer, placing the success or failure of a journey outside of 
the control of the individual and instead making it contingent upon the terrain and obstacles
encountered throughout the journey. A study by Semino et al (2015) found that even when 
there are setbacks, within the journey metaphor the results are not as catastrophic as with 
the battle metaphor. This is because setbacks, by their nature, are temporary whereas 
defeat by an opponent in a metaphorical war is more likely to be perceived as final. The 
journey metaphor also mitigates disagreements between doctors and patients. Since they 
are travelling the same path, with the same goal destination, any disagreements about how 
to reach that destination are simply differences of opinion. Similarly, obstacles on the path 
are obstacles for the doctors as much as for the patient. 
Semino et al found that journey metaphors were empowering for cancer patients when they
offered a sense of 'purpose, control, and companionship' (2015:4). Like the empowering 
use of the battle metaphor amongst groups of patients fighting a common enemy, Semino 
et al observed that patients often talked of making the journey in the company of other 
patients. Unlike the battle metaphor, however, patients who had made the journey earlier, 
or who were further along the same path, sometimes offered support to those patients just 
starting out or facing 'rocks in the road'. Semino et al also found that journey metaphors 
could give patients a sense of control or feeling of being in charge of their journey. The 
metaphorical construction of a visible path with metaphorical milestones is mirrored by the 
comments of an oncologist who suggested that 'the doctor needs to provide mile markers in
the patient’s journey, to tell the patient roughly where they are' (Penson et al, 2004:710). I
would argue that the journey metaphor benefits doctors in another way in comparison to 
the battle metaphor. Within Western medicine, and oncology in particular, doctors refer to 
the techniques available to treat a disease such as cancer as their armamentarium 
(Mukherjee, 2011). The obvious militaristic etymology of this term can serve to position the 
doctor as the source of the physical distress that the patient may be experiencing. The 
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choice of 'weapon' from the armamentarium is made by the doctor. In contrast, within the 
journey metaphor there is an implicit assumption that the path the patient is to travel is a 
feature of the world rather than a path constructed by the doctor. Doctors may choose (or 
recommend) specific treatment pathways but these are as much tools for the journey as 
they are the path to be travelled. As such the journey metaphor avoids doctors being 
construed as a foe and becoming the object of the patient's 'fight' as Demmen at al (2015) 
suggested can happen with the battle metaphor. This is not to say that the journey 
metaphor removes the power relations that exist between patient and doctor. Rather, I 
would suggest, such power relations become more akin to the relationship between an 
expert guide and non-expert traveller as they traverse hostile terrain.
The notion of the path that the patient is to travel being a feature of the world could also be
said to offer institutional benefits when treatments are not working. Within the battle 
metaphor, if a particular treatment is not working, a new way to attack the tumour must be 
found. However, within the current UK public healthcare system the availability of cancer 
drug treatments is not solely determined by their clinical efficacy or safety but also by 
whether they provide 'value for money for taxpayers' (National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence, 2017). Consequentially, not all possible treatments are available within the NHS.
As such the hospital, NHS, or government could be accused of blocking potentially life 
saving ways of fighting or defeating an individual's tumour. While a losing battle may be 
turned around by committing more or different resources to defeating the enemy, when the 
terrain on a journey becomes challenging the onus is still upon the cancer patient to keep 
moving forward. Responsibility for completion of the journey relies as much (if not more) 
with the patient as it does with the institutions who control treatment resources.
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Approaches to the use of metaphor
Much of the existing research into metaphor use has focused on categorising or quantifying 
the use of specific cancer metaphors. A great deal of this research draws upon Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) in which metaphors are assumed to be 
representations of conceptual categories that pre-exist social interaction. As mentioned 
earlier, Lakoff and Johnson argued that metaphors are central to how we think about the 
world. They are a means of understanding an abstract or unfamiliar idea in terms of another
more familiar idea. This raises the question of why different groups (patients, carers, 
medical professionals) appear to draw upon different metaphors of cancer and its 
treatment. If the same conceptual metaphors are available to everyone, how do people 
choose which metaphors they make use of? Charteris-Black summed up this limitation of a 
cognitive approach to the study of metaphor as it assuming 'that metaphor use is an 
unconscious reﬂex, whereas a pragmatic view argues that speakers use metaphor to 
persuade by combining the cognitive and linguistic resources at their disposal' (2004, as 
cited in Hart, 2008:94). Attempting to understand what it is speakers are persuading their 
listeners of is beyond the scope of quantitative methodologies, both in their focus on 
quantifying metaphor use and the assumption that the choice of metaphor is 'an 
unconscious reflex' rather than a discursive resource consciously chosen to achieve a 
specific action. To attempt to understand this we need to examine what the use of a 
particular metaphor accomplishes for the speaker. Doing so requires adopting a 
methodology that is mindful of the indexical nature of language, acknowledging that 
meaning is co-constructed within activity sequences between speaker and listener(s), and 
that rather than reflecting a concept within the mind metaphors are discursive resources 
used to construct a particular account of the world. Similarly, the brief consideration above 
of how institutions may benefit or suffer from the use of a particular cancer metaphor 
highlights the situated nature of our common sense understanding of cancer. Our talk 
occurs within a social, political context that entails shifting power relations between 
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speakers as well as between the individual and the subjectivities that dominant discourses 
make available to them. To ignore the sociopolitical context in which metaphors are 
employed is to ignore these power relations and the power of metaphor. To date, very little 
research has widened its analytical lens to focus on the wider cultural context as well as the 
context of the local interaction. A notable exception is Ehrenreich's (2009) scholarly critique 
of breast cancer culture and its roots in the neoliberal ideology of individual responsibility. 
However, whilst Ehrenreich is a cancer survivor, this was not an empirical study that aimed 
to observe how cancer survivors situate themselves within dominant discourses either in 
their everyday talk or talk of their cancer experience.
2.3 Cancer survivors
The term cancer survivor holds different meanings within different groups. Originally the 
term had a biomedical definition, referring to someone who had been treated for cancer and
remained disease free for five years. This definition was challenged by Fitzhugh Mullen 
(Dirven, van de Poll-Franse, Lonneke, and Aaranson, 2015), a medical doctor and cancer 
patient himself, who argued that rather than there being separate paths for those who 
survive cancer and those who do not, everyone diagnosed with cancer follows a single path 
of survivorship through different key stages. Mullen suggested that there are three stages 
to survivorship: acute survivorship, the period immediately following diagnosis when the 
focus is on surviving treatment; extended survival, when treatment is completed and the 
patient is focused on dealing with the physical and psychological after effects of treatment; 
and permanent survival, where recurrence of the cancer seems less likely to the patient but 
they are still dealing with the long term physical and psychological effects of treatment (Bell
and Ristovski-Slijepcevic, 2013). Mullen’s definition of who is classified as a cancer survivor 
has subsequently been modified by the National Cancer Institute to include family, friends, 
and caregivers of those diagnosed with cancer. Conversely, the European Organisation of 
Research and Treatment of Cancer limits classification as a cancer survivor to individuals 
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who have completed primary treatment following a diagnosis of cancer and who now show 
no evidence of active disease (Dirven et al, 2015). The term survivor is also considered 
distinct from the term survivorship, which refers to the period of time following primary 
treatment and cancer recurrence or end of life (Bell and Ristovski-Slijepcevic, 2013).
The label cancer survivor has been criticised for ignoring differences between the many 
forms of cancer, stage of malignancy at the time of diagnosis, and other factors such as 
age, sex and ethnicity (Bell and Ristovski-Slijepcevic, 2013). It is applied homogeneously to
hundreds of diseases, the survival of which is contingent upon effective screening and the 
availability of successful treatments for that particular disease. Given the heterogeneity of 
definitions of who qualifies as a cancer survivor and its contested nature Kahn et al (2012b)
suggested that researchers who choose to adopt the term should set out operational 
descriptions that clarify how they are using the term. As such, when I refer to someone as a
cancer survivor I am referring to someone who has completed cancer treatment and is 
living cancer free or in remission.
Resisting the cancer survivor label
Not only is there a lack of consensus over who qualifies as a cancer survivor amongst the 
institutions and organisations mentioned above, there is also a lack of consensus amongst 
the people towards whom the term is directed (Kahn et al, 2012). Understanding why 
people adopt or resist the identity of being a cancer survivor has been the object of 
considerable research. A study by Hubbard, Kidd, and Kearney (2010) found that while 
some people resisted being labelled a cancer survivor they nevertheless identified 
themselves as a survivor in terms of their general attitude towards adversity. To these 
individuals cancer was just another obstacle in a series of challenges that life had presented
them with and which they had overcome. A study by Miller (2015) found that the survivor 
label may be resisted by some people due to it tying them to their illness as they attempt to
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move beyond it post-treatment, a finding that is in accord with Kahn et al's (2012) earlier 
study. Studies by Kaiser (2008) and Kahn et al (2012) both found that while some cancer 
survivors used the survivor label in regards to other people, they rejected it in reference to 
themselves. This was due to a fear of recurrence, i.e., they could not be sure that they had 
survived, or due to feeling that they had not been close enough to death to warrant being 
classed as a survivor. The idea of proximity to death or receiving harsher treatments, such 
as chemotherapy, being associated with self-identification as a cancer survivor has also 
been reported by Cho and Park (2015) in a study involving people diagnosed during 
adolescence and young adulthood. Similarly the same idea was observed by Jagielski, 
Hawley, Corbin, Weiss, and Griggs (2012) in women who had experienced breast cancer, 
and by Kahn et al's (2012) explicit questioning of what people who had experienced cancer 
thought of the term cancer survivor. Cho and Park observed that identification with being a 
survivor varied considerably with the type of cancer. Similarly, Jagielski et al (2012) found 
that a more positive prognosis, being told that treatment was curative, better mental health
(at the time of the study post-cancer treatment), and having received chemotherapy could 
all be independently associated with identification as a survivor. Cho and Park 
acknowledged the methodological limitations of asking people to select one cancer-related 
identity rather than multiple identities, while Jagielski et al's study involved identifying 
statistical correlations between factors such as age and treatment received with whether 
participants identified themselves as a cancer survivor when overtly asked. A limitation of 
such studies is that they cannot tell us whether the participants describe themselves as a 
cancer survivor in everyday talk. In everyday talk we tend not to select an identity from a 
list offered to us. Rather we draw upon diverse discursive resources to construct our 
identities to meet our goals within the immediate interaction. Little et al (2002) have argued
that there is no culturally validated survivor identity and as such there is a need to identify 
what the survivor identity means to the individual who adopts or resists it. Exploring the 
actions accomplished by adopting or resisting the identity of cancer survivor not only can  
contribute to our understanding of what the identity means to the individual but can also 
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shine a light on the subjectivities that dominant discourses of being a cancer survivor make 
available. 
2.4 Cancer and the expectations of others
Our identities are not determined solely by ourselves or in isolation. Any identity we assume
requires validation from, and is influenced by, those around us (Hubbard et al, 2010). For 
example, Miller (2015) found that people who have completed primary cancer treatment 
may be altercasted into a survivor identity by their social network. Altercasting is a process 
whereby the way other people talk about us assigns us a particular identity (Weinstein and 
Deutschberger, 1963). In Miller's (2015) study cancer survivors reported being treated as 
someone who was over the experience of cancer (they had put the experience behind them)
when that did not reflect who they considered themselves to be. Other participants reported
social networks treating them as being the same person they were before cancer when this 
was an identity that they no longer wished for themselves or were unable to resume due to 
the sequelae of treatment. Miller found that cancer survivors often adopted the identities 
(whether 'survivor' or 'the same as before') that others were altercasting them into in order 
to maintain consensus and keep communication with their social networks open. The need 
to maintain consensus was also sometimes driven by a need for social support yet, 
conversely, maintaining consensus sometimes came at the expense of the support that the 
cancer survivor wanted. The expectations of others were not only constraining the identities
that the cancer survivor could assume but also constraining the support provided to them.
The influence of the expectation of others is not limited to the identities that individuals with
cancer assume but also extends to how cancer survivors are expected to behave. Cantrell 
and Conte (2009) highlighted that there is often an expectation from others that the person
who has survived cancer should display a perennially positive disposition and be untroubled 
by the everyday frustrations of life once they have completed their treatment. Similarly, as 
20
mentioned in Chapter 1, Willig has characterised the social expectations placed on cancer 
patients as an obligation to react to the disease with a culturally 'legitimate narrative' 
(2011:897). She argued that there is a cultural imperative to think positively and to fight 
the illness rather than to adopt a narrative of passivity and suffering. Ehrenreich (2009) 
suggests that this ideology of positive thinking is born of economic interests and the 
discourses of a neoliberal, meritocratic society where the individual takes responsibility for 
their own financial well being, their health, and their success. Within such an ideology, 
those who fall short in any of these categories do so because they did not try hard enough 
or did something to bring about their less than optimal circumstances. In this regard, the 
expectation of others can be considered to extend beyond the social and support networks 
described by Miller (2015) and encompass a more general cultural expectation. While some 
past research (Kahn et al, 2012) has highlighted cultural differences in the adoption of the 
term cancer survivor, little research has explored how cultural expectations limit the 
subjectivities available to cancer patients and cancer survivors.
2.5 Identity challenges
A medical diagnosis of any sort 'marks the moment when the individual is inserted into the 
discursive field associated with the diagnosis they have received' (Willig, 2011:901). As well
as the loss of control over one’s body that a medical diagnosis entails (Willig, 2009; Kameny
and Bearison, 1999) there is also a loss of control over the narrative of one’s life (Stacey, 
1997; Ehrenreich, 2009; Willig, 2011). The individual receiving the diagnosis is positioned 
as a patient and constrained by the discourses of their illness. In this respect, many of the 
challenges to identity that cancer presents are shared with other serious illnesses. For 
example, Miller (2015) described the construction of three separate identities during the 
cancer experience: the old (pre-cancer) identity, the patient identity (during treatment), 
and the new identity that emerges post-cancer. These parallel the stages of identity change 
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described in rheumatoid arthritis (Bury, 1982) and traumatic brain injury (Cloute, Mitchell, 
and Yates, 2008).
While Miller's (2015) study describes three separate identities, these are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. A study by Baker et al (2016) found that individuals recently diagnosed 
with or receiving treatment for cancer often drew upon both old (pre-cancer) and new 
(post-diagnosis) identities in talk about their emotional experiences following diagnosis. A 
strength of such research is its focus on the individual's conception of their identity rather 
than the researcher's identity labels. Similarly, unlike questionnaire based research such as 
Cho and Park's (2015) study discussed earlier there is not an assumption of a single, 
enduring identity. Identities are plural and in drawing upon multiple identities contradictions
may arise that need to be reconciled. Likewise, these plural identities are interrelated rather
than occurring in isolation from each other. Clegg Smith, Klassen, Coa, and Hannum (2016)
have argued that much past research can be criticised for focusing on cancer identities in 
isolation rather than in relation to pre- or post-cancer identities.
Discontinuity of identity
Little et al (2002) conceptualised personal identity as having three components: 
embodiment, continuity, and memory. They suggested that the identity challenges 
presented by extreme events can be characterised as discontinuities in any or all of these 
aspects of identity. Such challenges are not unique to cancer. Physical functioning may be 
affected by many other diseases, such as a stroke or heart attack, to the extent that one is 
unable to fulfil the social roles previously used to define oneself (Charmaz, 1994) resulting 
in a discontinuity of embodiment. Similarly, existential disruption or a challenge to our 
sense of continuous identity (Little et al, 2002) is not unique to cancer but may also be 
experienced following other serious illnesses. Where the identity challenges presented by 
cancer differ from those associated with other serious illnesses is in the ongoing existential 
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threat that the disease presents even after one is no longer classed as a cancer patient and 
is considered to have survived the disease. Even though an individual may be cancer free, 
the disease often continues to be present in their thoughts and emotions, in memories of 
the extreme experiences of treatment, and in the prospect of the disease returning (Little et
al, 2002). Cancer may also present a challenge to 'future memory' (Little et al, 2002). 
Future memory is different from goals or future plans. It is a means of giving meaning to 
who we consider ourselves to be, imagining our future self looking back on defining 
moments in our life. For example, imagining being a parent and the meaning and sense of 
purpose that this identity would give us (Little et al, 2002). If such future memories become
unachievable through the effects of cancer or its treatment our sense of who we are and 
who we are going to be is challenged. The cancer survivor is subsequently faced with 
deciding what direction their life is to take and who they are now to become. Surviving 
cancer also carries with it the association with a second chance at life (Little et al, 2002). 
There is a moral obligation to assess the life that has gone before and to choose the type of 
life that is to be lived going forward (ibid).
Chapter summary
This review of the literature has highlighted the dominant ways in which cancer is talked 
about within our culture and how these dominant discourses potentially make available 
certain subjectivities for those living with or beyond cancer. Past empirical research has 
examined the identity implications of illness and cancer to some extent. However, this work 
has mostly utilised quantitative methodologies and has focussed on assessing the 
prevalence of a narrow range of pre-determined identities putatively related to cancer 
survivors rather than the identities cancer survivors assume for themselves. There is a lack 
of research which acknowledges the shifting, multiple nature of identity and its relationship 
to both local and cultural context. Additionally, there is an absence of research which 
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examines the construction of such identities during the course of social interaction. 
Therefore, the research question addressed by this project is:
 How do people construct themselves in talk about their experience of cancer? 
Specifically:
 How do cancer survivors position themselves within dominant cancer discourses?
 What discursive resources do they draw upon within their accounts?
 What social actions are accomplished through a cancer survivor's chosen identity?
 What does a particular identity afford the individual over the other identities 
available to them?
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Chapter 3  Methodology
The aim of this research project is to examine how individuals who have experienced cancer
construct themselves in talk about their personal cancer experience. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, a diagnosis of any disease can change how the individual sees themselves and 
how they are viewed by others (Willig, 2011). Cancer possesses its own unique cultural 
associations and stigmata (Sontag, 1991) and carries with it what Willig described as an 
obligation to react to the disease with a culturally 'legitimate narrative' (2011:897). My 
focus here is not on the phenomenological lived experience of cancer but rather on how the 
person who has experienced cancer constructs themselves within such talk, the identities 
they assume in the spotlight and shadows of our shared cultural narratives of what it means
to be a person living with or after cancer. In other words, how they draw upon or resist our 
common sense understanding of cancer. Such common sense is constituted by the 
discourses of a given culture. As such the proposed method of analysis is the discursive 
psychology approach described by Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Edwards and Potter 
(1992) and later developed by Wetherell (1998) to adopt a more critical stance in terms of 
acknowledging the sociopolitical context as well as the local context in which interactions 
take place. Wetherell's critical approach aims to encompass some of the objects of 
Foucauldian discourse analysis, such as power relations and the constraints that social 
structures place upon the individual, into the discursive psychology approach of Potter and 
Wetherell. In light of this I will briefly outline both the Foucauldian approach and the 
discursive psychology of Potter and Wetherell (1987) before describing Wetherell’s (1998) 
approach and how it aims to combine elements of both methods by considering ‘one stance 
in terms of the other’ (Wetherell, 1998:388). The research question of 'how do people 
construct themselves in talk about their experience of cancer?' is informed by a social 
constructionist theoretical framework, and I begin this chapter by outlining the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of such a framework.
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3.1 Theoretical framework
A social constructionist approach to the study of social psychology is informed by a relativist
epistemology or theory of knowledge. It assumes that whether or not a material world 
exists we can only know it through signs and symbols such as language. Since these signs 
and symbols are historically and culturally situated, and constantly changing, meanings are 
not fixed or transparently mapped onto the 'true nature' of objects or people:
“Different constructions of the world can only be judged in relation to each other”
(Burr, 2015:93).
Edwards outlined a distinction between ontological and epistemic social construction, 
arguing that within discursive psychology the focus is on the 'constructive nature of 
descriptions rather than entities that (according to descriptions) exist beyond them' 
(1997:48). The focus is on how the descriptions people produce allow them to both know 
and construct the world around them. Within a social constructionist framework a material 
world does not precede our descriptions of it, instead a version of the material world is 
constituted by those descriptions (Edley, 2001b) whether they are descriptions of social 
practices or of rocks or atoms (Edwards, Ashmore, and Potter, 1995). When we talk or think
about the world we are doing more than offering a value neutral description of the world. 
We always 'encounter the world from some perspective or other' (Burr, 2015:172) and 
those perspectives influence the particular construction that we make use of in any given 
context (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Within such a theoretical framework the individual, 
like material objects, is constituted in everyday talk and through the discourses that are 
culturally available to them.
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3.1.1 Discourse 
Discourse has been variously defined as 'practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak' (Foucault, 1972:49), as 'all forms of spoken interaction, formal and 
informal' (Potter and Wetherell, 1987:7) and as 'a set of meanings, metaphors, 
representations, images, stories and so on that in some way together produce a particular 
version of events' (Burr, 2015:74). Common to all of these conceptualisations is the notion 
of discourse as social action (Wetherell, 2001). However, the social actions in question vary 
with the level of analysis: whether it is at the micro level of interpersonal interactions or at 
the macro level of how discourses create social structures that govern ‘the way that a topic 
can be meaningfully talked about’ or ‘used to regulate the conduct of others’ (Hall, 
2001:72). Different conceptualisations of discourse have given rise to different methods of 
analysing discourse. These can broadly be divided into two approaches. The fine grained 
analysis of discursive psychology is influenced by conversation analysis and 
ethnomethodology and interested in the action-orientation of everyday language use. 
Foucauldian discourse analysis is interested in investigations of discourse, power, and the 
subjectification of the individual (Wetherell, 1998).
3.1.2 Foucauldian discourse analysis
Foucault was interested in how discourse 'produces the objects of our knowledge' (Hall, 
2001:72). He argued that social practices entail meaning and that such meanings define 
acceptable ways that a subject can be talked about or ways that we conduct ourselves in 
relation to that subject (Hall, 2001). In other words, discourses construct 'certain ways-of-
seeing’ and ‘ways-of-being in the world' (Willig, 2001:107). Foucault also suggested that 
power, knowledge, and discourse are inextricably related (Carabine, 2001) and one of the 
aims of the Foucauldian approach is to question whose interests are best served by a 
particular discourse. Certain discourses may become more common sense than others and 
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consequently be accepted as ‘facts’ or more truthful, resulting in alternative discourses 
being marginalised or viewed as less truthful (Willig, 2001; Budds, Locke, and Burr, 2017). 
This resulting hegemony has consequences for the subjectivity of the individual since, within
the Foucauldian approach, the individual is another object constituted by discourse rather 
than an active agent employing discursive strategies in social interactions to achieve their 
social goals. Discourses constrain the ways-of-being available to the individual and the 
question of whose interests are best served by dominant (or alternative) discourses can be 
extended to encompass the ways-of-being that a particular discourse makes available.
The Foucauldian approach concerns itself with identifying the characteristics of the social 
worlds constituted by discourses, and how these social structures influence the subject 
positions available to the individual (Willig, 2001). It does not concern itself with how 
individuals draw upon shared discourses to construct versions of reality or identities that 
suit their social goals. A focus on this performative nature of language use by individuals is 
the concern of discursive psychology.
3.1.3 Discursive psychology
In contrast to the cognitive psychological approach, which conceptualises language as a 
transparent proxy of an individual's thoughts or emotions, discursive psychologists concern 
themselves with the performative, action-oriented nature of language (Potter and Wetherell,
1987). Cognitive processes such as remembering, attribution, and identity are re-
conceptualised as discursive actions. For example, remembering is viewed not as a process 
of information retrieval and the recounting of a past event but instead as a way for an 
individual to construct a version of reality that helps them meet their social goals through 
justification, attribution, classification, or blaming (Willig, 2001). Such processes emerge 
through 'all forms of spoken interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds' 
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987:7) and discursive psychology focuses its investigations on how 
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language is used (in a performative sense) in these situations. Psychological concepts such 
as identity, prejudice, or attitudes are not something that a person has but instead are 
things that a person does through their use of the discursive resources available to them 
within particular cultural and historical contexts (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Willig, 2001).
The cognitive and discursive approaches differ not only in their ontological assumptions 
about psychological concepts such as identity, but also in their epistemologies and the 
assumptions they make about knowledge, the world, and the role of the researcher (Willig, 
2001). The identification of 'personality types' relies on self-reports of research participants,
an approach that has been criticised for assuming that participants are 'naive subjects, 
intent primarily upon accurately reporting their cognitions to the researcher' (Wilkinson and 
Kitzinger, 2000:801). Participants' stated identification with particular phrases is taken as 
evidence of underlying enduring beliefs or attitudes. These assumed attributes of the 
individual are taken to be stable and enduring to the extent that future behaviour can be 
predicted from statistical analysis. The categories and phrases that participants are asked to
identify with may not reflect their 'endogenous concerns' (Wetherell, 1998). Consequently 
there is what Edwards (1997) calls a ‘reading-in’ of the researcher’s categories into the 
language choices of participants and, as I discuss in section 3.5, below, the process of 
coding or translating language from one type of data to another, along with the selection of 
statistical tests, is taken as being free from the influence of the researcher and the 
theoretical underpinnings of the research. In contrast, a discursive approach focuses on 
both the language used and the context in which it is employed, cognizant of the influence 
of the researcher on the participant’s choice of language. It is anti-essentialist and does not 
assume any enduring traits of the individual but instead is premised on the idea that the 
individual is socially constructed through discourse to achieve social actions within a specific
context (Burr, 2015). Language is not considered to be a proxy of inner thoughts or a 
means of transmitting these thoughts between different minds. Rather language is 
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considered to constitute both the social world and the individual within that social world. 
Discursive approaches ask what social actions or goals are being achieved by a particular 
discursive construction and how are they being achieved (Wetherell, 1998; Budds et al, 
2017).
Whilst both the Foucauldian approach and discursive psychology are interested in the action
orientation of language, they differ in where they focus their respective investigative lenses.
The discursive approach is focused on the action orientation of language within specific 
interactions and it does not overtly address the wider social or political context in which the 
interactions take place (Willig, 2001). As such the approach can be criticised as being 
apolitical and viewing the individual in relative isolation from the wider social context (Burr, 
2015). Conversely, the Foucauldian approach can be criticised for ignoring the agency of the
individual by focusing on social institutions and practices. However, the two approaches are 
not mutually exclusive and several critical approaches to discourse analysis have emerged 
that aim to draw upon features of each approach (Wetherell, 1998; Budds et al, 2017).
3.1.4 Critical discursive psychology
Critical Discursive Psychology adopts a perspective that acknowledges the agency of the 
individual, making use of culturally available discourses as they construct different ways-of-
being and ways-of-seeing, but one that is also aware of the constraints placed on 
subjectivities by dominant discourses within a given cultural, historical, and political period. 
Budds et al (2017) describe such an approach to conceptualising discourse as being both 
constitutive and constructive, 'in the sense that it, to some extent, shapes, enables and 
constrains, possibilities for identities and social action' yet 'it can be a tool used by 
participants within social interactions to achieve particular effects' (2017:13-14). Critical 
discursive psychology aims to do this through analysis of the subject positions (Potter and 
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Wetherell, 1987) that people adopt and the interpretative repertoires (Potter and Wetherell,
1987; Willig, 2001) that they draw upon. I will now briefly outline these two concepts.
Interpretative repertoires are a 'culturally shared toolkit' (Burr, 2003:60) of linguistic 
resources that people draw upon to construct accounts, justify behaviour, or construct 
themselves. Potter and Wetherell suggested that interpretative repertoires are often 
'organized around specific metaphors and figures of speech (tropes)' (1987:149). Whilst 
they may draw upon common sense or cultural synonyms they can be considered indexical, 
with the same repertoire being used by different people to achieve different goals 
depending on how, and in what context, they are drawn upon. Potter and Wetherell 
suggested that it is not enough to simply identify the different repertoires without analysing 
the context in which they are available, that we also need to consider the 'uses and 
functions of different repertoires' and the 'problems thrown up by their existence' 
(1987:149). In setting out his critical discursive approach Edley makes this one of his 
analytical concepts, arguing that by identifying interpretative repertoires 'we begin to 
understand the limitations that exist for the construction of self and other' (2001a:201). 
Within Edley's approach we identify and examine these limitations from the perspective of 
individuals adopting different subject positions within the interpretative repertoires available
to them.
Discourses make available particular ways-of-being or subject positions for the individual 
(Willig, 2001). Within the Foucauldian approach the focus is on the constraints that 
discourses place on subjectivities. The critical discursive approaches of Wetherell (1998) 
and Edley (2001) concerns themselves as much with the inconsistency of the subject 
positions assumed by an individual as with how the individual is positioned by dominant 
discourses. Subject positions are used by individuals to meet their own social goals 
(Wetherell, 1998), the choice of subject position changing as they manage the exigencies of
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a given interaction. The fluid nature of subject positions not only highlights the contextual 
nature of accounts and identities, Potter and Wetherell also suggested that:
“Varying accounts can be thought of as the residue of the social practices through which 
people organise their lives”
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987:122) 
This thesis adopts a critical discursive psychological approach to examining how people 
construct themselves within talk of their experience of cancer. It aims not only to explore 
the identities that individuals construct for themselves within a given interaction, but also to
identify the constraints that dominant discourses may place upon those subjectivities. In 
doing so the goal is to identify power relations that exist within our common sense 
understanding of cancer, and to ask who benefits (and how) from a particular discourse of 
what it means to be a cancer patient or survivor. By widening the analytical focus beyond 
the local interaction in which talk occurs, we can achieve a more complete understanding of 
what that talk accomplishes.
3.2 Sampling and recruitment
Participants were adults (minimum age 18, no upper age limit) who had completed initial 
cancer treatment at least one year prior to taking part but with no upper limit on how long 
ago they had completed treatment. Initial cancer treatment refers to treatment following a 
first diagnosis of a cancer of any kind. The exclusion of those who had received a second or 
further cancer diagnosis was partly the result of the research question looking at self-
identities through and beyond cancer, i.e., the experience of cancer as a single episode in 
that individual's life, and partly due to the existing literature about the identity challenges 
that may follow cancer not distinguishing between those diagnosed with a single primary 
tumour and those with multiple primary tumours or subsequent metastasis. Volunteers were
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recruited through Macmillan Cancer Voices (an online resource for cancer survivors to 
volunteer in fundraising, advocacy, or research), the Macmillan West Yorkshire Facebook 
page, and through word of mouth through my own extended social network. A web page 
providing information about the nature and purpose of the research was hosted at 
www.withthroughandbeyondcancer.com. I considered online recruitment to offer greater 
potential for recruiting participants who had been treated for different types of cancer and 
participants of a wider age range than my own extended social network. It also offered the 
opportunity to recruit participants who were not known to me, either directly or indirectly, 
and avoid any issues that may arise from familiarity. None of the participants were known 
to me before the research. The online recruitment campaign ran for four weeks. One 
participant was recruited through word of mouth, one made direct contact after seeing an 
online recruitment advert, and four were recruited through the Macmillan Cancer Voices 
website. Two additional enquiries were received about taking part but not followed up by 
the respondents. The six participants were the first six people to volunteer and a notice that
the project had recruited all the participants it required was placed on the Macmillan Cancer
Voices website2 and www.withthroughandbeyondcancer.com. Six participants were judged 
to be an appropriate number given the time frame and scope of the project. 
Participants
Below I provide a brief biography of each participant. Pseudonyms have been used 
throughout this thesis in all cases except for my own name.
Alan was diagnosed with a brain tumour when he was thirty years old. Initially he was told 
that the tumour was benign, the malignancy only being acknowledged when he travelled 
2 Closed opportunities to take part in research remain on the Cancer Voices website even 
after recruitment has closed.
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overseas for specialist treatment. Prior to his diagnosis Alan had worked as a builder. 
Following brain surgery to remove most of his tumour Alan suffered from a seizure disorder 
and was no longer able to work professionally. However, he still undertook some work as a 
builder by volunteering for a housing charity. At the time of our interview Alan's tumour had
been in remission for around 2 years. He is married with two children.
Bernadette was diagnosed with breast cancer just prior to her fortieth birthday. She 
underwent a mastectomy and radio and chemo therapies, but chose not to undergo 
reconstructive surgery. Bernadette had been cancer free for nearly 5 years at the time of 
our interview. She is a professional artist and mother to three school age children.
Greg was diagnosed with throat cancer ten years prior to our interview when he was 43. He 
underwent surgery as well as chemo and radio therapies. A sequelae of the radiotherapy 
was that Greg had been unable to eat for nearly ten years and received his nutrition 
through percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy or a tube through his stomach wall. In the 
months immediately prior to our interview Greg had been undergoing a pioneering surgical 
treatment that would allow him to eat a soft diet. Greg had been forced to retire on health 
grounds following his treatment. He had been cancer free for 10 years.
Deborah was diagnosed with breast cancer shortly after her fiftieth birthday. She underwent
surgical treatment and had been cancer free for 2 years at the time of our interview. She is 
the mother of 2 teenage children and one grown up child. Prior to her diagnosis Deborah 
had begun retraining in order to leave a job that she described as making her ill. 
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Margaret was diagnosed with bowel cancer when she was 67, two years prior to our 
interview. She had been widowed 5 years earlier when her husband had died from multiple 
myeloma (cancer of the bone marrow). During his treatment Margaret's husband had taken 
part in a drug trial involving Thalidomide. As a result of this he lost the use of his arms for 
the last 2 years of his life. Margaret has two adult children.
Sarah was diagnosed with breast cancer around her fiftieth birthday. She underwent 
surgery and chemo and radio therapies, followed by reconstructive surgery. Sarah has 2 
adult children and has been cancer free for 10 years at the time of our interview.
3.3 Method of data collection
The method of data collection was semi-structured interviews. This allowed participants the 
freedom to talk about aspects of their cancer experience that was important to them within 
loose topic areas that I judged to be related to identity. The use of interviews in the social 
sciences has been criticised (see Potter, 2012, for a discussion of the major arguments) for 
leading to an analysis of contrived talk rather than the naturally occurring talk that Potter 
and Wetherell (1987) referred to in setting out their approach to discourse analysis. 
Participants may react to the presence of the researcher, providing talk that orients towards
the participant’s perceived expectations of the researcher rather than their own everyday 
concerns. However, Potter (2012) rejected such criticism, arguing that there are no 
‘systematic differences’ between Police interviews in which reactivity to the researcher is not
an issue and those interviews undertaken explicitly as research. Similarly, Madill (2011) has
argued that the talk in semi-structured interviews shares one of the qualities (indirect 
complaints) of talk between friends - albeit a more asymmetrical version of it. While 
naturally occurring talk continues to provide what Madill calls the ‘gold standard’ of data, 
the ethical and practical constraints on recording such talk in the context of my area of 
35
interest made doing so prohibitive. However, the use of semi-structured interviews in this 
project may have offered participants a context not found in their everyday talk. Given that 
all volunteers were aware of my own experience of cancer any reactivity may have been 
towards myself as someone who has experienced cancer as much as to myself as a 
researcher (or indeed both). King and Horrocks (2010) highlighted the co-production of 
knowledge that takes place when data from interviews are analysed: both the interviewer 
and interviewee are engaged in the interaction, influencing and being influenced by each 
other. What is important here is to consider the discursive actions of both interviewer and 
interviewee within the context of the ‘activity sequences’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992) of the 
interview. As such my analysis encompassed not only what was being said by the 
participant but also how my questions and status within the interaction may have coloured 
responses to my questions.
Interview guide
An interview guide (Appendix 3) was produced to provide a number of prompts to explore a 
range of aspects of the cancer experience and produce rich data. The guide was partly 
informed by reflection on my own experience of being diagnosed with cancer and the 
challenges that this had presented to my sense of who I am, and partly informed by the 
existing psychological literature relating to cancer and the identity challenges that it may 
present. As the questions were deliberately broad to allow participants to talk about what 
was important to them, a number of probes or more focused questions were created to 
facilitate more in depth exploration of the participant's initial answer. Draft topic areas and 
questions were discussed with the research supervisors and the interview guide revised 
based on these discussions.
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3.4 Ethical considerations
Ethical approval was sought from and granted by the School Research Ethics Panel of the 
School of Human and Health Sciences (SREP/2016/007). Informed consent (Appendix 1) 
was given by all participants. All volunteers were provided with an information sheet 
(Appendix 2) about the study. This outlined who was undertaking the research, the aim of 
the study, and what participation would involve. The information sheet was available online 
via a web page accessible from the online recruitment advertisements placed on the 
Macmillan Cancer Voices website and Macmillan West Yorkshire Facebook group.
As part of both the verbal briefing and debriefing processes participants were advised of 
their right to withdraw. This information was also included in the information sheet 
(Appendix 2). Participants were advised that they could request a copy of the transcription 
of their interview within 2 weeks of the interview date. Volunteers were also able to 
withdraw during a subsequent one month period by emailing the researcher.
Talking about the experience of any illness can be emotionally upsetting and the information
sheet included details of telephone support lines to provide participants with emotional 
support.
3.5 Analysis
The analytical process involved three steps consisting of transcription, analysis using 
Edwards and Potter's (1992) Discursive Action Model as a guide to what people are doing 
with their talk, and consideration of Potter and Wetherell's (1987) tests of analytical 
validity.
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Transcription
Transcription can be considered the first stage of analysis since it not only entails becoming 
familiar with the data (King and Horrocks, 2010), it also reflects and shapes theory (Du 
Bois, 1991). Oliver, Serovich, and Mason (2005) outlined a continuum of transcription 
systems, with naturalised and denaturalised transcription as the two poles of the 
continuum. Naturalised transcription systems attempt to translate the fine details of spoken 
speech, such as pauses, changes in pace or volume, stutters or hesitations, into a written 
verbatim transcription; denaturalised approaches omit such details and focus on what is 
said rather than how it is said. Oliver et al linked these two approaches to different 
epistemological assumptions about the nature of language, suggesting that naturalised 
approaches assume that 'language represents the real world' (emphasis in original) while 
denaturalised approaches assume that 'within speech are meanings and perceptions that 
construct our reality' (2005:1274). In other words the former assumes that transcripts are 
transparent records of what was said, the latter that transcription is a 'representational and 
interpretative process' (Davidson, 2009:39) which means transcripts are as much a 
reflection of the theoretical concerns and choices of the researcher as they are a rendering 
of the talk in question. Oliver et al (2005) described how elements of naturalised and 
denaturalised approaches may be combined depending on the particular research 
objectives. The absence of a canonical pairing of a particular transcription method with a 
specific theoretical framework means that the relationship between theoretical assumptions 
and the method adopted needs to be made explicit (Davidson, 2009), which I will now do.
The research question of 'how do people construct themselves in talk about their experience
of cancer?' focuses on how individuals position themselves within the available 
interpretative repertoires relating to people who have experienced cancer. The focus is not 
on the intricacies of 'turn taking and conversational repair' (Burr, 2015:181) as in 
conversation analysis, but rather is on the content of their talk. As such a naturalised 
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transcription system employing detailed notation, such as the Jefferson (1996) system 
typically used in conversation analysis, was not required and would have impacted on the 
readability of the transcripts, possibly obscuring the 'wider discursive meanings in the data' 
(Budds et al, 2017). Therefore I have used an abridged version of the Jefferson system that
includes details of pauses or other paralinguistic features to help establish the context or 
flavour of the interaction for the reader. King and Horrocks (2010) have suggested the 
inclusion of paralinguistic features of speech, such as changes in volume or elongation of 
specific words when they are used ironically, is useful to help establish the context of the 
transcribed talk for the reader, and that such features can be selectively used where they 
affect the meaning of what is said. The notation used is given below in Table 1 (below).
(.) Un-timed pause
(0.5) Timed pause with time indicated in seconds
((laughs))
Non-verbal information or paralinguistic 
features of speech
[Yeah]
Overlapping speech. Speech within square 
brackets overlaps with that directly above it in 
the transcription
Table 1 (above): Transcription key
Following transcription a period of repeated reading of each interview was undertaken until I
arrived at the point Edley (2001) described as 'having a sense of what comes next'. What 
followed was an iterative process of identifying sections of talk that I felt related to the 
research question and issues of identity. To do this I made us of Edwards and Potter's 
(1992) Discursive Action Model.
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The Discursive Action Model
One of the challenges that the postulant researcher faces in undertaking discourse analysis 
is what Edwards called 'the lack of a clear distinction between theory, phenomena, and 
method' (1994:17). Potter and Wetherell (1987) have similarly suggested that discourse 
analysis is 'heavily dependent of craft skills and tacit knowledge' (1987:175). In order to 
explicate some of this tacit knowledge Edwards and Potter (1992) put forward their 
Discursive Action Model (DAM). This is not a model in the tradition of cognitive psychology, 
whose models tend towards 'link[ing] together putative mental operations to show how 
input is transformed to a different output' (Potter, Edwards, and Wetherell, 1993:388) often
without instantiating how such transformations take place. Rather the DAM 'is designed to 
link different features of participants' discourse together in a systematic manner' (ibid:388).
In practice the DAM afforded me a number of lenses through which I could interpret the 
data. The first of these lenses was a focus on action, or what people were doing with their 
talk, rather than a focus on participants' cognition or behaviour. The second lens was a 
focus on issues of fact and interest. Any account is open to being challenged as serving the 
self-interests or prejudices of the individual who offers it. As such accounts are rhetorically 
constructed to undermine alternative versions (descriptions) of events (Edwards and Potter,
1992). The final part of the DAM, and the final lens through which the data was read and 
interpreted, is a focus on agency and accountability. Accounts are often constructed as 
presenting facts, or features of the world beyond the control of the speaker. Such factual 
reports attend to issues of accountability or who is responsible for certain events within the 
account. Issues of accountability may also be present in the reporting of an account. 
Limitations of the methodological approach
Discursive psychology’s focus on localised interaction can be criticised for excluding the 
wider social context and power relations that exist within, and between, social institutions. 
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However, the discursive psychological approach described by Wetherell (1998) and Edley 
(2001a), and adopted by this study, attempts to foreground any constraints placed upon 
the individual through the identification of interpretative repertoires.
Similar to criticisms of cognitivism for assuming that language transparently represents the 
speaker's thoughts, discourse analysis can be criticised for the implicit assumption that the 
meaning of talk is 'assumed to be transparent to the analyst [but] its possible interpretation
by other parties is not investigated' (Burr, 2002:123). Schegloff (1997, as cited in 
Wetherell, 1998) has criticised discourse analysts for importing their own categories and 
theoretical concerns into the analysis rather than focusing on the concerns of those whose 
talk they are analysing. Addressing this criticism, Wetherell emphasises that it should 
always be possible to ‘point to the data’ (1998:394) to substantiate any claims that are 
made about how people are using talk.
Validating the analysis
The analytical process described above is concerned with what Potter and Wetherell call the 
'function and consequence' (1987:168) of talk. Once these have been identified, Potter and 
Wetherell described the next stage of the analytical process as the formulation of tentative 
hypotheses about these functions and consequences. The data is once again revisited 
looking for evidence to support any hypotheses. Potter and Wetherell (1987) outlined 
several criteria that may be used as justification for the validity of any discourse analysis, 
the first of which is that any analysis should provide coherence to the data or demonstrate 
how it fits together. Any hypotheses about a particular pattern of accounting being used for 
a specific goal should be applicable to the whole body of data and not just specific passages.
In other words, there should be no explanatory or logical gaps in the explanation offered by 
the analysis. In cases where the hypothesis does not appear to apply, Potter and Wetherell 
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suggest that identifying features that mark that passage out as a special case can be used 
to confirm the scope of a theory or how much it can account for, a process they call 
'confirmation by exception' (1987:170).
Potter and Wetherell's second check of analytical validity is participant orientation. 
Discourse analysis is an interpretative endeavour (Fairclough, 1989) and what the analyst 
sees as consistent or different are not necessarily what participants see as consistent or 
different. The analysis should demonstrate participants' orientation by 'pointing to the data' 
(Wetherell, 1998) to clearly illustrate how a participant interprets and reacts to what is 
being said
Potter and Wetherell's third test of validity is the ability of an analysis to identify new 
problems and solutions. An analysis may identify regular patterns of accounting which 
support a hypothesis that participants are drawing upon different interpretative repertoires, 
such as Mulkay and Gilbert's (1983) analysis of biochemists' explanations of scientific 
theories. Mulkay and Gilbert identified instances where these repertoires appeared 
incompatible to themselves, as analysts, but not to the individuals drawing upon the 
repertoires. The biochemists oriented to the incompatibility of the two repertoires within 
their talk. This prompted the identification of a third (reconciliatory) repertoire that Mulkay 
and Gilbert labelled the truth will out device.
The final test of validity that Potter and Wetherell outlined was fruitfulness, or the extent to 
which an analysis 'make[s] sense of new kinds of discourse and to generate novel 
explanations' (1987:171). This may be a new way of answering old problems or linking 
issues that were previously considered to be unrelated (Wood and Kroger, 2000). Antaki 
neatly summed up the fruitfulness of a piece of research as 'the aha! experience' (2004).
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The selection of extracts and reflexivity
The process outlined above describes various checks used in the selection of extracts for 
analysis. At the end of this stage of the analytical process, not all of the chosen extracts will
necessarily be chosen for in-depth analysis. This may be as a result of initial analysis 
helping to refine the research question or a narrowing of analytical focus to one particular 
area that is identified as worthy of more in-depth analysis. Explicit justification of the choice
of extracts for inclusion in the final report is surprisingly rare within discursive psychology 
journal articles. This could leave an analysis open to the criticism of not being 
representative of the body of discourse as a whole, or the researcher selecting extracts that 
support their own agenda. Louw, Todd and Jimarkon (2014) demonstrated how such 'cherry
picking' of extracts could be used to support competing hypotheses about the same data. 
They put forward a mixed-methods approach to the selection of extracts based on the 
frequency of occurrence of keywords within the data. However, this was within the domain 
of corpus linguistics. Within discursive psychology such a method could be criticised for 
what Edwards (1997) called 'labelling and counting' rather than focusing on the 
performative nature of the talk being analysed. So how does one justify the inclusion of one
extract over another? In describing their criteria for selection of passages for analysis, 
Madill and Barkham (1997) highlighted the interpretative nature of discourse analysis 
arguing that the goal is 'to reach an understanding of the text and present it in such a way 
that the reader can assess this interpretation' (1997:234). Similarly, Fairclough's caution 
against treating texts as objects 'whose formal properties can be mechanically described 
without interpretation' (1989:27) is a reminder that the goal is not to describe the world as 
it really is, or to present a 'true' account of what is going on in participants' talk, ignoring 
the role of the researcher in the process. The goal is to offer an interpretation of a text, one 
that reflexively takes into account the analyst's own orientation towards what is being said 
as much as it takes into account the participants' orientation. So how exactly did I do this in
practice?
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The research question of 'how do people construct themselves in talk of their experience of 
cancer?' relates not only to the construction of a particular account but also to what 
individuals are constructing themselves in relation to. As such, following the initial analysis I
began to group passages of talk into categories of what that talk was oriented towards. In 
other words, what the individual was constructing themselves in relation to. In contrast to a
thematic analysis, in which the same theme is present within different extracts of talk, I 
was as much interested in differences between how individual participants accomplished 
similar actions. For example, the extracts included in Chapter 4 can all be considered 
challenges to the individual's identity yet each is oriented towards a different type of 
challenge, and each makes use of very different discursive techniques to negotiate that 
challenge. Similarly, while all the extracts within Chapter 5 can be considered to relate to 
negotiating continuity of identity they do so in ways that are different from each other. I 
considered the variety of discursive resources being drawn upon to offer rich insights into 
the research question. The extracts in Chapter 6 stood out for two reasons. These extracts 
all come from Alan who, while living cancer free at the time of our interview, was living with
a prognosis of his brain tumour beginning to grow again within the next 7 years. Alan also 
described himself exclusively in terms of his working life. Following brain surgery he was no 
longer able to engage in paid work. As such I considered his identity talk to be of particular 
interest, given this change in circumstances would, on the face of it, require Alan to 
construct a new post-cancer, post-work life identity.
Co-construction of knowledge in research
Given the ubiquity of cancer in our society it is reasonable to assume that a fair number of 
researchers are themselves cancer survivors. However, little research has focused on the 
role of the researcher who has survived cancer in the co-creation of knowledge. The notable
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exception is Willig's (2009) scholarly reflection on the role of writing in the search for 
meaning following her cancer diagnosis. In terms of empirical work, Little et al (2002) 
acknowledged one member of the research team as being a cancer survivor, though the 
methodology they adopted (grounded theory) was one that involves achieving consensus 
about the themes identified within participants' talk. As such, while still an interpretative 
process, the knowledge produced cannot be considered to have been produced solely by 
cancer survivors. In contrast my own status as a cancer survivor means that the findings of 
this research can be considered to be knowledge co-created solely3 by those who have 
experienced cancer.
3 This is not to ignore the role of the research supervisors who did not identify themselves 
as cancer survivors.
45
Chapter 4 Findings: challenges to identities
Introduction
This chapter focuses on talk related to challenges to people's identities presented by their 
cancer diagnoses. The extracts chosen here illustrate some of the variability in the concerns
of the participants in question, as well as highlighting some of the discursive techniques that
they use to negotiate the different identity challenges that their diagnosis presents to them.
The notion of illness as biographical disruption (Bury, 1982; Charmaz, 1994) entails an 
interruption to both who we know ourselves to be and who others know us to be. In 
discursive terms, receiving any medical diagnosis 'marks the moment when the individual is
inserted into the discursive field associated with the diagnosis they have received' (Willig, 
2011:901). However, people may resist as well as adopt the dominant subject positions 
available within this discursive field. Any biographical disruption may not necessarily be 
construed in negative terms, even if it is a consequence of a negative event such as being 
diagnosed with cancer.  The concept of biographical disruption also contains an implicit 
assumption that the interruption caused by the illness is temporary, that normal service will
be resumed after an indeterminate period. This notion of resuming pre-cancer identities is 
one of the areas that I focus on in this chapter, and also in chapter 6 where I consider how 
people negotiate new identities after their cancer treatment is complete.
Claiming and resisting the patient identity
The first extracts that I present for analysis come from Sarah, who was diagnosed with 
breast cancer at age 50 around ten years before our interview. After explaining my 
motivation to carry out the research I asked Sarah "Can you tell me what happened to 
you?". Sarah began her answer by telling me how she had worked "all my life" (line 2) as a 
clinical psychologist. Sarah retired from her role as a clinical psychologist three and a half 
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years after completing her cancer treatment ("I was fifty one and a half when I went back 
(1.5) and I decided I was going to go at fifty five", Interview 6:477-478). She described 
how "retiring for me was such a big thing (.) I've (.) being the end of (0.4) something that I
found really hard towards the end of my professional life (0.9) I gave away (0.4) all my 
books (.) all my lecture notes going back from undergraduate years that I'd still got (0.5) I 
got rid of all of those (.) Absolutely everything I got rid of (0.6) Erm (1.4) And it was just 
like (2.1) shutting a door on a bit of my brain (1.1) that is just locked", Interview 6:855-
862). Despite this definite end to her professional career, Sarah still drew upon aspects of 
her identity as a psychologist within her account. For example, Sarah described how when 
talking to members of a breast cancer support group that she was still a part of that she 
hoped "my professional background enables me (0.7) to be able to say something that's 
helpful to them (0.3) without burdening them with (0.8) what is was like for me" (Interview 
6:576-8). It is against this background that I introduce Extract 4.1.
I have chosen the following longer extract not only for Sarah's explicit identity talk, which 
forms only a small part of quite a lengthy monologue, but also for how it illustrates the 
situated and occasioned nature of identities. Sarah, like all those who took part in the study,
was talking about an experience several years in the past and talking about it within the 
context of a research interview. I have touched on the debate over whether interviews can 
be considered natural talk in the previous chapter (Section 3.4). The issue that I consider of
interest here is that of reactivity towards the researcher, or how the presence of a 
researcher (even as an observer who does not directly engage with the participant) can 
influence the talk of participants in interviews. As such I will consider Extract 4.1 in two 
parts: first in relation the context in which the account is being given (that of retired 
psychologist being interviewed by a post-graduate psychology student) and then in terms of
the account itself. In the sequence below I ask Sarah whether her professional knowledge 
and experience as a clinical psychologist had been helpful to her during the period of her 
diagnosis and treatment:
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Extract 4.1, Interview 6
612. Michael: You were talking about how your professional experience can 
613. help people (.) Do you think it helped you going through it? I 
614. mean you talked about (.) at the start you were (.) not really 
615. sure what was going on
616. Sarah: I think looking back (.) you know I often hear people talk about
617. people being in denial (.) and I've often thought I'm not quite 
618. sure what that looks like and I think well maybe that was in 
619. denial (0.4) My brain was not allowing me (0.5) to hear (1.1) 
620. or to take in to process (1.2) what was happening to me (0.9) 
621. So I can look back and think "Oh yeah maybe that was a good 
622. example of denial" (0.9) Erm (0.9) But in terms of coping with 
623. the experience (1.2) Erm (3.9) I'm not sure really (0.3) I think 
624. I just became (0.6) I stopped being me (0.6) and became (1.2)
625. a patient (1.7) I mean all the (.) there's so much emphasis 
626. nowadays on (0.7) patient involvement and patient choice (0.5)
627. and I didn't want to make choices I just wanted to be told (0.3)
628. "This is what you've got to do (0.4) And here's your next 
629. appointment (.) Just turn up" (1.2) Erm (1.0) So when I was 
630. offered the chance of being on the clinical trial (0.7) I didn't 
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631. know what to do (.) I didn't want to make choices I just want 
632. to be told (0.3) "This is what you've got to take (0.5) Just come
633. along at this time and we'll do it to you and then and go home 
634. and take the tablets so you're not sick"
As mentioned above, Sarah began the interview by telling me that she had worked "all my 
life as a clinical psychologist" (Interview 6:2). It is worth repeating this self-description here
because of the identity that it 'makes relevant' (Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998) in 
comparison to the other identities that Sarah could have oriented to. This self-description 
also has what Schegloff (1992) called procedural consequentiality. It influences proceedings
in terms of 'constructing the terms of the debate' (Horton-Salway, 2004:358) within Sarah's
account as being "from a psychologist's point of view" (Interview 6:5), and also influences 
the local interaction of the interview. There is an expectation that members of a particular 
category will possess certain knowledge or behave in a certain manner associated with that 
category, what Sacks (1972) called category entitlement. Members of the category of 
medical professionals are expected to be knowledgeable about health and disease, 
psychologists about thoughts, behaviour and motivations. They are also entitled to make 
use of specialist knowledge associated with their respective domains. These expectations 
implicitly inform my question to Sarah (lines 612-615). While the explicit question was 'Do 
you think it helped you going through it?' the implicit enquiry was as to how her expertise 
did or did not help her. My own category membership (that of student, researcher, or 
however Sarah chose to categorise me) is also particularly relevant to this interaction. Not 
offering an explanation would undermine Sarah's construction of herself as an expert and 
she provides a possible explanation ("I can look back and think 'Oh yeah maybe that was a 
good example of denial'") for the lack of awareness that she reported at the time of her 
diagnosis. When Sarah's talk turns towards coping with the experience of cancer she is "not
sure really" (line 623) whether her knowledge and experience helped her. This is dilemmatic
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for Sarah: highlighting that her knowledge and experience were not useful to her in coping 
with cancer could undermine her membership of the category of expert. She manages this 
ideological dilemma (Billig et al, 1988) by recasting herself into the category of patient, 
saying "I think I just became (0.6) I stopped being me (0.6) and became (1.2) a patient" 
(lines 623-625). Sarah alludes to what being a patient means to her when she talks of "so 
much emphasis nowadays on (0.7) patient involvement and patient choice". This is an 
emphasis on patient agency and accountability, but "nowadays" implies that such emphasis 
was not always the case. Sarah constructs different categories of patients, those that are 
empowered and the ones that preceded "nowadays", who implicitly were passive in regards 
to being involved with making choices about their own treatments. She explicitly resists the 
idea of the empowered patient, describing not wanting to make choices and the dilemma 
that this presented her with when offered a place on a clinical trial ("I didn't want to make 
choices I just wanted to be told  (0.3) 'This is what you've got to do (0.4)'", Extract 
4.1:627-628). Receiving a medical diagnosis and being cast into the role of a patient has 
been described as entailing a loss of control over one's body as it becomes the object of 
medical examination and treatment (cf. Willig, 2009; Kameny and Bearison, 1999). The loss
of control over one's body and, similarly, a loss of control over the narrative of one's life 
(Stacey, 1997; Ehrenreich, 2009; Willig, 2011) could ostensibly be considered negative 
consequences of a cancer diagnosis. However, within Sarah's account they are not 
constructed in negative terms. For Sarah becoming a patient offers her a temporary 
reprieve from the accountability of having to make choices and being in control of her 
treatment ("I just want to be told (0.3) 'This is what you've got to take (0.5) Just come 
along at this time and we'll do it to you and then and go home and take the tablets so 
you're not sick'", lines 631-634). Her diagnosis and treatment facilitated a moratorium from
a work situation that she had described as impacting upon her health ("I'd been feeling 
(0.7) poorly and burnt out at work (1.2) and thinking 'If only I could break my leg and be 
off work' ((both laugh)) but not be poorly with it", Interview 6:12-14). Since Sarah defined 
herself in terms of her professional identity, a break from this identity required her to 
50
construct herself in different terms, that of a patient. As such the patient identity could be 
considered to have been welcomed by Sarah, albeit not in circumstances that she would 
have chosen ("I was thinking (0.9) you know "Be careful what you wish for" because (0.7) I
wanted a break and here I was getting a break but not in the way that I expected", 
Interview 6:96-99). Rather than challenging Sarah's identity, it could be said that her 
diagnosis afforded her the opportunity to reposition herself within the same medical 
discourses, on the other side of the practitioner-patient dualism. However, this presents a 
new challenge in the form of "patient involvement and patient choice", especially when 
Sarah is offered a place on a clinical trial ("when I was offered the chance of being on the 
clinical trial (0.7) I didn't know what to do (.) I didn't want to make choices", Interview 
6:628-630). Participation in the clinical trial entails making a choice, something Sarah 
explicitly says she does not want to do. She negotiates this dilemma by saying "I just  
became quite passive and (0.6) and just sat back and let everything happen to me (.) and I
didn't really think too much about what was going on I just went from day to day" 
(Interview 6:639-642).
Extract 4.1 has illustrated how Sarah re-negotiated her identity as a healthcare professional
and recast herself into the identity of a patient. For Sarah this was not a straightforward 
crossing of the floor from one party to the other, but rather necessitated describing different
categories of patient and how the notion of an empowered patient involved in making 
treatment decisions was problematic for her. The extract has also illustrated how identities 
are not only negotiated within an account but also in the telling of the account. Orienting 
her account as being from a psychologist's point of view has procedural consequentiality for 
the interview. Sarah's identity is that of an expert in contrast to my own non-expert 
identity. Sarah's expert status influences my questions to her, and she must defend this 
status in her answers.
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Resisting the cancer patient identity
In contrast to Sarah, the next extract comes from a participant who resisted any challenges 
that her diagnosis presented to her pre-cancer identity. Extract 4.2 is from my interview 
with Bernadette, who was diagnosed with breast cancer shortly before her fortieth birthday 
and had been cancer free for nearly five years at the time of the interview. Much of 
Bernadette's report of her cancer experience was oriented to the effect that her diagnosis 
had on her children and how they had reacted to it ("I think the thing that really really 
upset me the most was (0.6) not so much having the cancer was the kids and having a 
Mum with cancer" Interview 2:93-95; "my main concern was protecting them from it and 
not letting them worry about it", Interview 2:98-99). In other words, her account was from 
the perspective of her as a mother rather from the perspective of her as an individual. In 
the extract below I asked Bernadette about her feelings when her children had not been 
present - when she may have assumed an identity other than being a mother.
Extract 4.2, Interview 2
698) Michael: (0.8) Going back to (.) when you first got your diagnosis you 
699) said you had this kind of fight or flight (0.7) and your focus was
700) very much on staying positive for the children (.) protecting 
701) your children (0.6) What about when the children weren't there
702) and you take your Mum hat off and it was just you (.) or just 
703) you and ((husband)) How did you feel then about (0.9) what 
704) you were facing and (0.6) what had happened?
705) Bernadette: I'd be lying if I said we didn't have blips and there were 
706) emotional times (.) I think (0.4) Erm (.) I'd say half way 
707) through the chemotherapy (0.6) Erm I would have like you 
708) know (.) I'd look at myself I think the thing with chemotherapy 
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709) is you get away with being a cancer patient before then (.) You 
710) can walk around and you don't look like a cancer patient (.) But
711) as soon as you start going through chemotherapy your looks 
712) really do change and (.) you know my hair fell out and my face 
713) became quite rounded because of the steroids that they give 
714) you before every chemo session to boost your immune and to 
715) keep you going (0.8) Erm and you have all kinds of injections 
716) and stuff you have an injection in your stomach to boost (.) 
717) erm your white blood cells that are produced by your bone 
718) marrow so they give you an injection in your stomach so it'll 
719) boost your biggest bone in your body which is your pelvis to 
720) produce more white blood cells to help combat (1.0) any bugs 
721) or anything (0.5) I'm also really prone to cold spots and for 
722) some reason the cold spots had started coming along on a band
723) on my back (0.8) and they said that that was quite serious so I 
724) had to have another drug on top of the drugs that I was having
725) because of erm (.) if that manifested itself into full blown 
726) herpes 'cause I (.) 'cause the chemo had destroyed my (.) it 
727) was destroying my immune system and it could kill me so it (.) 
728) I know getting flu can kill you while you're (.) So the (1.1) as 
729) much as try to shove all that to the back of your head it's still 
730) there it's like a shadow there (.) and erm (.) ((Husband)) was 
731) brilliant I'd say (.) again up until half way and then (.) there 
732) were tears and (0.8) you know as in anything that you go 
733) through that's traumatic you (.) you do get to a point where 
734) you go "Gosh this is awful" you know? (.) You wouldn't be 
735) human I think if you didn't you know and (.) I remember once 
736) sort of (0.6) looking in the mirror and it wasn't me you know 
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737) this (0.7) bald person with bits of her eyebrows missing (.) no 
738) eye lashes and big round face and (.) just looking at her 
739) thinking "God you look like a cancer patient you look like (0.8) 
740) you've had (1.0) you know (1.0) you look like you've been 
741) blasted with a load of (.) radiation (.) You know you look (0.5) 
742) terrible" (1.0) So erm (0.9) And so yeah (.) there were tears 
743) and (1.6) I wouldn't say (0.8) I (0.7) became despondent with 
744) it (.) Or I wouldn't say you know (.) you'd have a good cry (.) 
745) And then you'd pull your (.) pick yourself back up and then 
746) when the kids did come back you'd be positive again you know?
Of interest within this passage is how Bernadette resists the identity of cancer patient. She 
describes how "the thing with chemotherapy is you get away with being a cancer patient 
before then" (lines 708-709). There is an implicit judgement that being a cancer patient is 
an identity that should be hidden, it is something you "get away with" rather than 
something other people do not notice or know about you. This negative judgement is not 
made explicitly in reference to having the disease, or its consequences, but rather in being 
able to "walk around and you don't look like a cancer patient" (line 709-710). Prior to 
chemotherapy, Bernadette's embodied identity is unchanged as far as how other people see
her is concerned. Once her appearance changes, marking her out as someone with cancer, 
the identity that other people ascribe to her is changed. As mentioned earlier, a loss of 
control over the narrative of one's life has been described as one of the challenges to 
identity that follow a cancer diagnosis (Stacey, 1997; Ehrenreich, 2009; Willig, 2011). 
Central to our life narrative is who we construct ourselves to be, and who others construct 
us to be. As such resisting having others identify oneself as a cancer patient could be 
considered a way of defending pre-cancer identities.
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When Bernadette's change in appearance does allow others to identify her as a cancer 
patient she makes use of what Edwards and Potter (1992) call a factual report, drawing on 
descriptions of biological and medical processes (facts) in a causal attribution for her 
changed appearance (lines 711-726). Edwards and Potter suggested that making 
attributions through a factual version of an event is a way of managing dilemmas of stake 
or interest. In any account the speaker can be judged as having 'desires and motives' 
(Potter, Edwards, Wetherell, 1993) that can be used by others to discount the speaker's 
version of events, e.g., it could be said that they are motivated by self-interest. Presenting 
an account as factual means that any negative evaluation of it becomes a negative 
evaluation of 'a feature of the world' (Potter, Edwards, Wetherell, 1993:403). My 
interpretation of what is at stake here is Bernadette's identity as a cancer patient. The 
changes in appearance that prevent her from getting away with being a cancer patient are 
'a feature of the world' and ineluctable. Bernadette does not choose the identity of cancer 
patient, but she can no longer resist it once her appearance changes. 
Extract 4.3, below, is a continuation of the sequence of talk in Extract 4.2. In it Bernadette 
describes her reasons for choosing to undergo chemotherapy. Once again she makes use of 
a factual report, this time in justifying her decision to undergo chemo and radio therapies. 
Two things interest me about this passage. First, that Bernadette's account is once again 
constructed to justify her decision to undergo chemotherapy. Second, that this factual 
report is immediately followed by an explicit attribution of Bernadette's motivation for 
undergoing chemotherapy that is centred on her identity as a mother:
Extract 4.3, Interview 2
747) Bernadette: they said "You've got a sixty percent chance of it coming 
748) back" (1.3) If you do all this treatment (.) if you just (.) 
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749) if you do the chemotherapy and the radiotherapy and 
750) everything (0.9) it makes it up to a twenty percent 
751) chance of it coming back which is only ten percent more 
752) than the average (.) person on the street (1.0) So it 
753) were kind of a no brainer
754) Michael: Yeah
755) Bernadette: It were kind of (0.6) OK it's not going to be the best thing 
756) going through this chemotherapy but (0.9) man alive I've got 
757) three children you know fat lady's not singing for me yet I want
758) to (.) I'm going to do everything I can to (1.4) get (.) get you 
759) know (.) clear up this and give myself the best possible chance 
760) I can
The first part of this extract offers a factual report in the form of various statistics. The 
statistics present a marked contrast between Bernadette's prognosis without undergoing 
adjunct treatment ("You've got a sixty percent chance of it coming back") and the likelihood
of recurrence after undergoing "the chemotherapy and the radiotherapy and everything". 
This latter figure is presented in relation to "the average (.) person on the street". 
Rhetorically "only ten percent more than the average (.) person on the street" provides a 
greater contrast with "a sixty percent chance of it coming back" than saying "a twenty 
percent chance of it coming back" (Potter, Wetherell, Chitty, 1991). To use Bernadette's 
words, this justifies the decision to undergo chemo and radio therapies as being "a no 
brainer". It also, as mentioned earlier, means that any negative evaluation of Bernadette's 
reasoning becomes a negative evaluation of 'a feature of the world' (Potter, Edwards, 
Wetherell, 1993:403) in this case breast cancer recurrence rates and the efficacy of 
different treatments. In contrast to this factual report, Bernadette subsequently attributes 
her motivation for undergoing chemotherapy to "I've got three children". The dissimilitude 
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between the two passages, which both offer justification for choosing to undergo adjunct 
treatment, highlights the need to balance competing communication goals (Miller, 2015). 
On the one hand Bernadette may be managing the expectations of others in terms of taking
responsibility for the cancer, electing to undergo treatments that will leave her chances of 
recurrence only 10 percent more than the average person. On the other hand she is doing 
what is best for her and her family.
Identity challenges presented by bereavement
I now wish to turn to my interview with Margaret and the very different identity challenges 
that she was facing in comparison to Sarah and Bernadette. Margaret lost her husband to 
cancer five years prior to herself being diagnosed with bowel cancer. She received her own 
diagnosis two years before our interview. Margaret's husband had taken part in a drug trial 
involving Thalidomide, and as a result had lost the use of his arms ("Anyway what 
happened ultimately was that it destroyed all the nerves in his hands and arms up to here 
((indicates elbows)) (1.0) So the last four years of his life he had to be spoon fed (.) He 
couldn't even wipe his own bottom (1.2) So it ruined both our lives", Interview 4:26-30). 
Margaret underwent surgical treatment for her own cancer but refused adjunct 
chemotherapy due to what had happened to her husband ("so everything then I am totally 
suspicious (.) of (.) the pharmaceutical industry", Interview 4:32-33; "So he said 'And we'll 
start on the chemo next Tuesday' and I said 'Excuse me, Doctor (0.7) Do I get any say in 
this?' (0.9) And he was absolutely stunned I said 'I will not have chemotherapy'", Interview 
4:356-358).
The dominant theme within Margaret's account was not related to any challenges presented 
by her own cancer diagnosis or treatment, but rather the effect that losing her husband had
upon her. Arguably she was renegotiating her identity after the loss of her husband. Indeed 
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we are all constantly renegotiating identities within social interactions as we attempt to 
reach or maintain consensus with our interlocutors. The reason I have included extracts 
from Margaret's interview within a chapter focusing on challenges to identity is that she 
appears to falter at the start of this renegotiating process. She is unclear (or undecided) 
about whom to construct herself as in light of the changes to her life.
Margaret began our interview by offering a précis of what had happened to her husband 
("Anyway what happened ultimately was that it destroyed all the nerves in his hands and 
arms up to here", Interview 4:26-28). Extract 4.4 is from the same sequence of talk:
Extract 4.4, Interview 4
583. Margaret: But (0.3) I lost ((Husband)) (1.9) It would have been our 
584.  fiftieth wedding anniversary last year (2.0) We were married in 
585.  nineteen sixty five (0.9) and erm (0.7) I can't see the point 
586.  there's no point in me carrying on
Of interest in this passage is how Margaret's reflection on how she and her husband would 
have celebrated their fiftieth wedding anniversary is brought to a close by describing how "I
can't see the point there's no point in me carrying on" (lines 585-586). This was something 
Margaret repeated throughout her account ("You see I've seen there's no point (1.3) of my 
life in my life at all now", Interview 4:191-192; "Anyway so that's really the story of my life 
and I honestly cannot see (.) There's no point in me being here (.) I'm totally non-
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productive", Interview 4:205-206). Margaret's talk of "there's no point in me being here" 
caused me considerable concern with regards to her wellbeing and subsequently I oriented 
my questions towards different times in her life. My intention was to see if Margaret's 
description of her life having "no point" extended to other periods of her life, and also to 
allow her to remind herself (through her own account) of times when she may have judged 
her life to be meaningful. In Extract 4.5 I asked Margaret how she would describe herself at 
the present time:
Extract 4.5, Interview 4
429. Michael: (5.2) Picking three different points in your life (2.1) If I'd 
430.  asked you who you are to describe yourself (0.7) Well I'll ask 
431.  you now (.) If I ask you to describe yourself now who you are 
432.  (.) how would you describe yourself?
433. Margaret: (4.8) I'm ((full maiden name)) (0.9) Irish catholic (1.3) Atheist 
434.  Irish catholic atheist (1.0) Erm (1.0) Mother of two fucking 
435.  useless sons (2.4) and looking for some point in life and I can't 
436.  find a point in life (1.3) at all (.) There's no point for me being 
437.  here now
What interests me about Margaret's answer is how she begins her self-description using her 
maiden name. After nearly fifty years of marriage it would be reasonable, or even expected,
to continue to use her married name. Interestingly, Margaret used her married name in all 
of our communications prior to actually meeting. However, here she does not draw upon 
that identity to describe who she is now. She reverts to how she was known before her 
marriage. In other words, Margaret resists identifying herself in terms of the identity she 
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has (presumably) used throughout nearly 50 years of marriage. Margaret then describes 
herself as "Irish catholic (1.3) Atheist Irish catholic atheist" (lines 433-434). This is 
dilemmatic for Margaret given that she is no longer a catholic, but rather an atheist. She 
negotiates this dilemma by repeating the description and bookending it with the term 
"atheist" for emphasis ("Atheist Irish catholic atheist", lines 433-434). In identity terms 
such a description constructs a social identity for Margaret. It is an identity that she draws 
upon throughout her account ("we're Irish Catholics you see so we all went to either of 
three schools", Interview 4:315-316). Growing up as part of the Irish catholic community 
was attributed with Margaret becoming a teacher ("there was enough of us in the end to be 
able to take control of the City Council and it was (1.0) known locally as the catholic mafia 
(1.2) Well it was dictated to my Dad that I had to be a teacher (.) catholic school teacher", 
Interview 4:611-615). Margaret described how during her teacher training she had decided 
it was not the career for her ("Anyway so after my first teaching practice I had to go and 
confess (1.0) to the priest that I didn't like it (.) I thought I might seriously harm a child 
(0.6) and it would be best if they moved me from it", Interview 4:622-625) and how her 
being part of the Irish catholic community lead to her eventually changing career to work in 
housing management ("it's really just to explain how I ended up in housing because it was 
the only decent vacancy where they wanted a catholic in again", Interview 4:627-628). 
Given that these key moments in Margaret's life are all related to her identity as an "Irish 
catholic" drawing upon this identity now offers some coherence to who Margaret constructs 
herself to be at a time when arguably her individual identity is not so clear. In contrast, 
when asked to describe herself before either herself or her husband had been diagnosed 
with cancer Margaret offered a very clear description of how she and others would have 
defined her:
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Extract 4.6, Interview 4
475. Michael: (2.3) And what about (1.1) before (1.3) ((Husband's)) 
476.  diagnosis? If I asked you then how would you describe yourself 
477.  then?
478. Margaret: (1.1) Erm I would have been a matriarch (1.4) The matriarch 
479.  (1.8) Do you watch Mrs Brown's Boys ((TV show))?
480.  Michael: ((laughs))
481.  Margaret: A hundred times worse than that
482.  Michael: [Mrs Brown?]
483.  Margaret: Yeah (.) Erm (4.5) Yes (.) I was (2.2) Feared of nobody (.) In 
484.  fear of nothing (.) Nothing at all could phase me I could handle 
485.  everything (1.7) Erm (2.6) ((long sigh)) (0.9) I'm trying to 
486.  think back before ((Husband's)) diagnosis (4.8) No I think the 
487.  head of the family really (2.0) Yeah
Within this passage Margaret's self-description is explicit. She is not just "a matriarch" but is
"The matriarch". She qualifies what this means by describing how "I was (2.2) Feared of 
nobody (.) In fear of nothing (.) Nothing at all could phase me I could handle everything" 
(lines 482-483). She sums herself up as "the head of the family really" (lines 485-486). 
There is a clear contrast between Margaret's description of herself here and her description 
in Extract 4.5. In years past she was "The matriarch" and "the head of the family". Today 
she is the "Mother of two fucking useless sons (2.4) and looking for some point in life" (lines
434-435). In the three brief extracts that I have included here Margaret's account is not 
oriented to her cancer diagnosis but rather to the loss of her husband and how she "can't 
find a point in life" (line 435). The challenge to where she stands in the world is not 
presented by her being diagnosed with cancer, but by being widowed and unable to move 
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forward ("People are saying 'Why don't you go on holiday?' so ((Husband)) and I used to go
on holiday a lot (0.8) And I can't bear the thought of going to a place that I've been with 
him (0.7) and you're walking down the street and think 'God yeah we went in that bar and I
remember' you know ((low voice)) I can't do it ((normal voice)) I just can't do it (1.5) So 
I'm stuck really", Interview 4:468-474). Unlike Sarah and Bernadette, whose accounts 
involved negotiating the challenges that a cancer diagnosis and treatment presented to who
they constructed themselves to be pre-cancer, Margaret's account is oriented to the 
challenges of bereavement and finding an identity in later life.
Chapter summary
In this chapter I have illustrated three very different challenges to identity within the 
accounts of three of the participants. Whilst these challenges are present in participants' 
talk about cancer, some of these identity challenges could have followed other illnesses or 
events. For example, for Sarah the transition from healthcare professional to patient 
following her diagnosis was welcome in as much as it offered her a reprieve from a 
professional identity that she had been finding increasingly stressful and impacting upon her
health. Sarah negotiated this change in identity by describing how she 'stopped being me' 
and became a patient. However, this same description would not be out of place in an 
account of other illnesses. What was of importance to Sarah's identity was the moratorium 
of her professional identity and finding herself on the other side of the healthcare 
professional-patient dualism. In contrast, the challenge presented to Bernadette's identity 
was unique to cancer. Bernadette described how she had been able to hide being a cancer 
patient before changes in her appearance caused by chemotherapy. Following these 
changes in appearance Bernadette drew upon the discursive technique of a factual account 
to manage a potential issue of stake that could arise from her no longer resisting the cancer
patient identity. The identity challenge being faced by Margaret was not the result of her 
own cancer diagnosis but rather of her being widowed and, in her own words, there being 
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no point in her carrying on. This same identity challenge may have arisen regardless of the 
cause of her husband's death. In negotiating this challenge Margaret drew upon her social 
identity as an Irish catholic, even though she had long ago rejected the religion.
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Chapter 5  Findings: I'm still the same person
Introduction
The focus of this chapter is talk of being the same person after cancer as before it. In each 
of the interviews I asked the participant 'Who are you?' both in terms of who they saw 
themselves as being now, after the disease, and also in terms of how, postdictively, they 
would have described themselves before their cancer diagnosis. As with the challenges to 
identity discussed in Chapter 4 the identity work discussed here often involves managing 
ideological dilemmas, as people construct themselves as being the same person as they 
were before their illness. The first aspect that I wish to focus on is a distinction between 
being the same person and being unchanged by the experience of cancer. To talk about 
being the same person yet at the same time be a changed person may involve 
contradictions. Indeed our everyday talk is replete with contradictions. We talk of 'being 
true to yourself' or of 'the real me', yet conversely we are often exhorted to 'be who you 
want to be' or 'be the best version of yourself'. Similarly, we may talk about being the same
person yet at the same time how we have changed over time. There is an assumption that 
some part of who we are (such as our world view) changes and some part of who we are 
(such as our values) stays the same. What I am interested in is how people organise talk of 
being changed or staying the same. For example, which aspects of their identity do they 
construct as being changed or unchanged? What do they present as evidence of change or 
continuity within their accounts? In the first extract, I introduce an example of such 
dilemmatic talk and examine how contradictions are managed when the participant 
constructs herself as being the same person while also talking of how her experience has 
changed how she views the world.
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In Chapter 4 I illustrated some of the ways in which Bernadette resisted the identity of 
being a cancer patient. Building on that, I begin this chapter by introducing an example of 
Bernadette describing how the experience of cancer has changed how she sees the world, 
rather than changing who she is. Just as she resisted the identity of being a cancer patient 
she resists defining herself in terms of cancer. For example, in Extract 5.1 Bernadette 
attributes having a positive attitude towards her daughters travelling and gaining a broad 
experience of life as being the result of her cancer experience. Extract 5.1 comes from a 
sequence of talk in which Bernadette had described the experience of fundraising for a 
cancer charity, that supports one of the hospitals she was treated in, in order to undertake 
a trip to climb volcanoes with other cancer patients and people affected by cancer.
Extract 5.1, Interview 2
625. Bernadette: But yeah like I say more positives have come out of it (0.6) 
626. Erm (0.5) erm yeah and (0.5) you know you do look at life with
627. (1.3) different eyes (0.4) but then you've got to get on with the
628. day-to-day you can't be climbing volcanoes and ((laughter)) 
629. and living that kind of (0.9) let's live life for today and 'cause 
630. you don't know what's round the corner there's still the day-to-
631. day to get on with
632. Michael: [Yeah] Lunches have to be made (.) Clothes washed
633. Bernadette: Absolutely (.) Absolutely (.) It never stops and when there's 
634. five of us it never stops so erm (0.5) But again because (.) 
635. because I went through that I were (.) Am I taking up too 
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636. much time?
637. Michael: No not at all
638. Bernadette: Are you sure? So I was (.) I'd be really positive with the girls 
639. saying "You need to go travelling you need to do this that and 
640. other" and erm so last year ((Daughter)) got the opportunity to
641.  go to ((Country)) (.) to see her pen pal (0.8) and we scrimped 
642. and saved and got on with (0.4) flew her over she were only 
643. ((age)) and that were really hard to do but I wanted her to 
644. experience (.) I want her to have a broad (0.5) view of life and 
645. experience things that (.) 'Cause you don't know what's round 
646. the corner and you know you can't be frightened of everything 
647. and and you know there's a risk in everything (.) Erm and (0.4)
648. I think you know (0.7) you must (.) You must em...(1.0) grab 
649. life by the balls 
This extract begins with Bernadette acknowledging that "you do look at life with (1.3) 
different eyes" after cancer. Bernadette constructs herself as the one who takes care of the 
rest of the family and places the needs of her family before her own needs or desires ("you 
can't be climbing volcanoes and ((laughter)) and living that kind of (0.9) let's live life for 
today", lines 627-629; "It never stops and when there's five of us it never stops", lines 632-
633). This positioning was echoed elsewhere in Bernadette's account, describing how "you 
know the amount of washing and ironing my ironing and washing breeds in the night you 
know? ((Laughter)) I've got tonnes of it and you know thirty five pairs of socks a week just 
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to you know erm" (Interview 2:1090-1093), and also in Bernadette's description of her 
initial reaction to her Dad's suggestion that she take part in the volcano climbing fundraiser:
"I just laughed at him and went 'Oh yeah as if I've time to climb volcanoes with three kids 
(0.5) Come on'" (Interview 2:560-561). Within Bernadette's account the needs of her family
consistently come before her own needs.
In lines 643-645 of Extract 5.1 Bernadette describes wanting her daughter "to experience 
(.) I want her to have a broad (0.5) view of life and experience things that (.)". This can be 
interpreted as a traditional parenting stance, the idea of a parent wanting their children to 
experience things that they themselves may not have done when they were young. What 
interests me about this passage is how Bernadette explicitly attributes wanting her 
daughters to travel and have a broad experience of life to her own cancer experience ("But 
again because (.) because I went through that I were", lines 634-635; "I'd have never done
that (0.4) if I hadn't gone through that experience you know", Interview 2:597-598). 
However, the object of this talk of positive change, of looking at life "with different eyes", is 
Bernadette's daughters not Bernadette herself. Bernadette does not say that this new world
view has directly changed who she is. While Bernadette may be looking at life "with 
different eyes" they are still, first and foremost, the eyes of a mother rather than the eyes 
of someone who has been through cancer.
Extract 5.1 above is one of the few occasions when Bernadette constructs her identity with 
explicit reference to the experience of cancer. Throughout our interview Bernadette oriented
her account towards the effect her diagnosis and treatment had on her family rather than 
the effect it had on her. Her account was very much that of a mother rather than of her as 
an individual. The importance of this identity for Bernadette is further illustrated in the next 
extract. As mentioned above, one of the questions I asked participants was "Who are you?'.
Extract 5.2 is Bernadette's answer to this question:
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Extract 5.2, Interview 2
1048. Michael: (1.6) If I asked you (0.8) 'Who are you?' as in describe who 
1049. you are to me (.) now (.) How would you describe yourself?
1050. Bernadette: (0.8) What since having the cancer?
1051. Michael: Well now today
1052. Bernadette: (1.8) Just a normal mum of erm (0.9) three (.) I'm a mum first
1053. my kids come first always I'm a wife and then (.) I'm an artist 
1054. I'm passionate about art and erm (0.9) I love screen printing 
1055. and passionate about that erm and (1.1) yeah and a good 
1056. friend erm (.) Yeah just the cancer doesn't define me I wouldn't
1057. say (.) I wouldn't even call myself a survivor or erm (0.7) a 
1058. cancer patient or an ex- I think erm it doesn't the cancer 
1059. doesn't define me at all I think I only draw positives from my 
1060. experience and that it's erm (1.3) maybe like I say it helps fuel 
1061. a lot of decisions that I make and in a more positive way (0.6) 
1062. Erm I think (0.7) I would be lying if I said there isn't that 
1063. shadow (0.5) That you're (.) there's always there in the back of
1064. your mind (0.7) that (1.1) you know (.) it could come back you
1065. don't know
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In lines 1052-1053 Bernadette constructs herself as "Just a normal mum" in emphatic terms
before setting out other labels ("wife", "artist", "good friend") that she would apply to 
herself. Just as emphatic as her construction of herself as "a mum first" is her assertion that
"the cancer doesn't define me". The identities that Bernadette does construct for herself are
all identities unrelated to cancer, identities that she may have constructed for herself before
cancer or if she had never had the disease. She even explicitly rejects the labels of 
"survivor", "cancer patient", or "ex-cancer patient". Whilst rejecting constructing herself in 
terms of cancer Bernadette does acknowledge a positive consequence of her experience of 
the disease. She describes how "I only draw positives from my experience" and that "it 
helps fuel a lot of decisions that I make and in a more positive way". While Bernadette may 
"only draw positives from my experience" she is, nevertheless, drawing on parts of that 
experience rather than leaving it behind. Her stance in the world is "more positive" as a 
result of her cancer experience. Arguably this could be interpreted as an implicit 
construction of a different post-cancer identity, of being a more positive person post-cancer.
This change was acknowledged when I asked Bernadette how she would have described 
herself before her cancer. Her answer was once again prefaced by categorising herself as "a
mum (0.4) first and foremost" (Interview 2:1083). Bernadette subsequently described her 
pre-cancer self as "I probably wouldn't have been as (1.5) enthusiastic about life as much 
as I am now" (Interview 2:1084-1085). She expands on this description in Extract 5.3, 
below, in which she gives examples of ways in which she considers herself to be more 
positive post-cancer:
Extract 5.3, Interview 2
1093. Bernadette: sometimes I think I'd let the little things get on top of me 
1094. which I don't now (1.4) erm so (0.7) I might have sort of not 
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1095. been as positive (2.0) as I am now about things like that or I 
1096. might have let (0.8) little things (0.5) you know but you have a
1097. mind shift when you go through something like that (.) you 
1098. look there's a bigger picture and you step back and little things 
1099. that did (.) you know "Oh you've left your glass in the front 
1100. room again" little daft things (0.8) you know I mean I still say 
1101. "Come on clear your glasses and stuff" don't get me wrong but 
1102. (.) It doesn't (1.2) grind me down like it used to (.) I don't 
1103. know as well if that's (.) that's a little bit of going through that 
1104. experience but also experience now 'cause I'm an older person 
1105. erm (.) you know you get that bit wiser as you get older don't 
1106. you? And also you go through other experiences of friends 
1107. having cancer or (.) or other things you know (.) My friends 
1108. (0.8) Some of my friends have lost their parents now and 
1109. things like that and er you know some of my friends' parents 
1110. have got dementia so people you knew [inaudible] now aren't 
1111. the same people and I think little experiences like that (.) of 
1112. other people not just what I've been (.) make that bit more 
1113. positive and wiser as well don't they? So I think erm (1.5) I 
1114. think there's a lot of that as well just feeling a little bit older 
1115. and wiser
70
What interests me about this extract is how Bernadette initially attributes her changed life 
perspective ("I'd let the little things get on top of me which I don't now") to her experience 
of cancer ("you have a mind shift when you go through something like that") but 
subsequently offers an alternative attribution that any change may be the result of her 
being "older and wiser". She warrants this description of herself by describing the 
experiences of friends having cancer, losing their parents, or their parents suffering with 
dementia. Attributing changes in her life perspective this way, and by extension changes in 
herself, normalises the experience of cancer. It is constructed as an unexceptional or to-be-
expected part of life. Miller (2015) has suggested that one of the reasons people may resist 
defining themselves in terms of their cancer (such as identifying as a 'cancer survivor') is 
that it ties them to their experience of the disease and makes it difficult to move past it. 
Arguably, normalising the experience of cancer could be a similar strategy for moving past 
the experience. It becomes a normal part of life in the same way that one's parents dying or
being afflicted with a disease associated with old age is considered normal. Culturally we do 
not have a label for an adult who has lost their parents, in the way that we have labels for 
children who have lost their parents, perhaps for the very reason that it is a normal, 
expected part of life. Normalising the occurrence of cancer, by highlighting its ubiquity, may
warrant Bernadette's description of herself as "older and wiser". She is the sum of her 
experiences rather than the product of just one experience, her experience of cancer.
In the extracts discussed above I have highlighted the dilemmatic nature of constructing 
oneself as being the same person pre- and post-cancer while simultaneously acknowledging
changes that are being attributed to the experience of cancer. In Extract 5.1 Bernadette 
negotiated the dilemma of constructing herself as the same person post-illness by 
accommodating her changed world view into her pre-cancer identity of a mother. The object
of Bernadette's talk regarding this new (changed) world view was her daughters rather than
Bernadette herself, allowing her to maintain a coherent pre- and post-cancer identity of 
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"just a normal mum". In Extract 5.2 Bernadette explicitly rejected defining herself in terms 
of cancer, yet also described drawing on positive aspects of her cancer experience when 
making some decisions. She expanded on this in Extract 5.3 and offered being "older and 
wiser" as an alternative attribution for her changed perspective.
In the next extracts I wish to discuss a different type of dilemma that arises within talk of 
still being the same person yet also describing changes that have followed the experience of
cancer. This dilemma concerns issues of coherence of identity within an account. Describing 
oneself as being the same person pre- and post-cancer necessitates constructing a coherent
identity within one's account. Inconsistencies in descriptions of the type of person one is 
now and the type of person one was before cancer potentially undermines the assertion that
'I am the same person' or 'I was the same person'. This is the focus of Extracts 5.4 and 5.5 
from Interview 3 with Greg, who was diagnosed with throat cancer aged 43, around ten 
years before our interview. Three years after his treatment the sequelae of radiotherapy 
had resulted in Greg having to give up his career with the company he had worked for since
leaving school. During the interview Greg described how work had been central to his pre-
cancer life ("it was [important] because we didn't have kids (.) My wife's got a career has 
got a good career I had a relatively good career (0.3) So yeah that involved a lot of our 
lives and your lifestyle according to it so" (Interview 3:234-236); "That's where most of my 
social life was with with people at work", Interview 3:768-769). Since his enforced 
retirement Greg had undertaken a number of cancer related volunteering roles, working 
with the National Health Service and cancer charities. In comparison to Bernadette, whose 
identity was constructed around her role as a mother, Greg's descriptions of himself were 
centred around his attitudes and motivations rather than his past professional or current 
voluntary roles. The issue that I consider as being dilemmatic within Greg's account is his 
description of being the same person yet also, within the same sequence of talk, describing 
quite marked changes in his attitude and motivations. Extract 5.4  illustrates this dilemma 
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and how Greg manages it within his account. The sequence of talk in Extract 5.4 follows on 
from my asking Greg how he would define himself now, ten years after his cancer 
diagnosis:
Extract 5.4, Interview 3
679. Michael: Well how would you describe yourself to me? Someone like 
680. you've just met
681. Greg: (3.1) I dunno I'd just say a fun loving person (.) who loves life
682. Michael: Yeah (2.9) And how would you have described yourself (.) ten 
683. years ago (.) before all this?
684. Greg: (0.9) I would have said I'm still the same person (1.7) but I 
685. was much (1.4) and it's easy to say (.) I was (1.7) more (0.6) 
686. focused (0.7) on my percept (.) other people's perception 
687. maybe of you and of also possessions
688. Michael: (1.0) Right
689. Greg: (1.0) Whereas now I'm much more (1.8) it's much more about 
690. relationships and (.) Erm (1.8) I mean how I'm perceived by 
691. others (.) doesn't (.) I think I'm just as thick skinned and it 
692. doesn't particularly bother me (.) But it it's much more about 
693. relationships and feelings and things like that (.) Whereas 
694. before I think it was much more (0.6) erm (0.6) as I think most
695. people are unfortunately in the world it's much more about me 
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696. and the world and you know (.) and what (.) As long as I'm 
697. alright sort of thing and now (0.6) yeah there's an element of 
698. that but it's much more how other people feel and how you can
699. help and things like that
700. Michael: OK
701. Greg: So I think I'm more caring (.) hopefully I'm a more caring and 
702. giving person than I was before
In line 681 Greg describes himself as "a fun loving person (.) who loves life". When asked 
how he would have described himself ten years ago (pre-cancer) he suggests that he 
"would have said I'm still the same person" then immediately modifies this ("but") before 
describing how in the past he was "more (0.6) focused (0.7) on my percept (.) other 
people's perception maybe of you and of also possessions" (lines 685-687). As mentioned 
earlier, Greg's account defines him in terms of his attitudes or motivations rather than in 
terms of any social role such as his past profession or current volunteer roles. There are a 
number of features of how Greg constructs these attitudes within his account that I wish to 
highlight.
Greg's account can be considered a before-after account. Before: "it's easy to say (.) I was 
(1.7) more (0.6) focused (0.7) on my percept (.) other people's perception maybe of you 
and of also possessions" (lines 685-687). After: "it's much more about relationships" (lines 
689-690). A potential dilemma of stake or interest arises in relation to why Greg's priorities 
pre-cancer were focused on people's perception of him and his materialism. Describing his 
priorities as such could lead to a negative evaluation by myself as the listener, the counter 
argument to Greg's position being that it is easy not to be focused on "other people's 
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perceptions maybe of you and of also possessions". In other words accountability for 
prioritising one's own needs over those of others lies with the individual. Greg is 
accountable. Such a challenge would construct Greg as being selfish or lacking in social 
responsibility. There is also the issue of the context of Greg's account. A significant change 
between Greg's life pre- and post-cancer is that he is no longer able to work. As such any 
changes in Greg's attitude could again be attributed by myself (again as the listener) to his 
being in a different social environment. In other words, Greg's past working environment 
could be interpreted as playing a causal role in his former attitude ("it was very tough the 
((Business)) ten years ago (0.9) was before everything exploded ((financial crisis)) and 
there was a lot of pressure with (1.5) targets and it was very driven and it was waiting to 
explode and I'm glad what's happened has happened", Interview 3:780-783). The culture of
this environment could be criticised as being individualist and lacking in social responsibility.
This would be an implicit criticism of Greg himself, given that he had worked in the same 
industry, for the same company, all of his working life, and that elsewhere in the interview 
he described one of the benefits of his illness as being "it's got me out of a work that maybe
I should have been bold enough to say "I've had enough and I don't like the way the 
((Company's)) going" (Interview 3:1061-1063).
Greg manages these issues of stake or interest when he describes how "whereas before I 
think it was much more (0.6) erm (0.6) as I think most people are unfortunately in the 
world it's much more about me" (lines 693-695). He makes use of a number of discursive 
techniques to defend his position (of having been focused more on himself) against possible
challenge. First he objectifies the attitude that is at stake, using "it" rather than 'I' ("it's 
much more about me and the world and you know (.) and what (.) As long as I'm alright 
sort of thing", lines 695-697; "it's much more how other people feel and how you can help 
and things like that", lines 698-699). As I have discussed elsewhere, this constructs the 
attitude in question as a feature of the world rather than as some psychological attribute of 
Greg himself. He also uses what Pomerantz (1986) calls an Extreme Case Formulation ("as 
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I think most people are unfortunately in the world", lines 694-695). This is an account that 
draws upon extreme descriptors such as all, none, most to defend the legitimacy of a 
speaker's stance, to locate a phenomenon 'in the object' rather than in the words of the 
speaker, or to construct a behaviour or event as ubiquitous so as to defend it against 
judgement that it is right or wrong (Edwards, 2000). If everyone or most people do it then 
it cannot be that bad. If everyone or most people do it then it should not need justifying. 
And if everyone or most people do it then it cannot be limited to (or a failing of) the 
industry that Greg used to work in. By describing his pre-cancer attitude as being shared by
"most people" Greg normalises his past behaviour and also once again locates that 
behaviour (in Greg's words) "in the world". It is a legitimate stance, a stance taken by 
"most people", that does not need justification. Any challenge towards Greg's past 
behaviour would be a challenge directed at "most people" and "the world" rather than 
towards just Greg himself. He further defends his stance by adding a judgement of 
"unfortunately" within his description. In identity terms this may be a negative judgement 
of Greg's past attitude or behaviour, but it is not a negative judgement of Greg himself. His 
attitude was how "most people are unfortunately in the world", or a feature of the world. 
Greg's account also makes use of what Billig calls 'two-handed reasonableness' (1998:22), 
by acknowledging that "now (0.6) yeah there's an element of that", a nod of the head 
before turning away from, but not completely turning his back on, the ideology of 
individualism or self-interest. Again this guards his account (and his identity) against 
possible criticism that he may still hold the attitude of "as long as I'm alright". He 
acknowledges that this is indeed the case, only with the proviso "but it's much more how 
other people feel and how you can help and things like that". Acknowledging that there is 
still "an element of that" also creates coherence in Greg's identity. He has the same attitude
as he had in the past, he is the same person, only now his priorities have changed. This 
sequence of talk ends with Greg's description that "I think I'm more caring (.) hopefully I'm 
a more caring and giving person than I was before". He does not say that he is now a caring
or giving person but rather that he is a more caring and giving person than he was before. 
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Implicitly, these qualities were a part of who he has always been. Again, this adds 
coherence to Greg's construction of his identity. The qualities with which he defines himself 
today were always present, even if they were not his priorities.
The dominant theme within Extract 5.4 is of positive changes that have followed Greg's 
cancer diagnosis and treatment. He highlights a shift in his priorities from material and self 
interests to being focused on other people's feeling and relationships. What does Greg 
achieve by constructing his account in this particular way? Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, and 
Larson (1998) have suggested that attributing a positive benefit to a traumatic event helps 
to mitigate negative consequences such as threats to one's self-concept. For example, an 
individual may attribute a new found appreciation for life or improved relationships to the 
traumatic event making them re-assess what is important to them. Greg's account could 
certainly be interpreted in this way. He describes himself as "a fun loving person (.) who 
loves life" (line 681), how "it's much more about relationships and feelings and things like 
that" (lines 692-693), and how "hopefully I'm a more caring and giving person than I was 
before" (lines 701-702). In other words, Greg describes himself as having an appreciation 
for life and a new found focus on relationships. 
In Extract 5.5 I further explore Greg's description of his changed attitudes and motivations. 
Following on from the sequence of talk in Extract 5.4, I asked Greg how his close friends 
and family would describe him today:
Extract 5.5, Interview 3
726. Greg: Well hopefully they'd say I'm the same person I don't know it's 
727. it's difficult that
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728. Michael: But who is that person? I mean the same person as in you 
729. haven't changed but if I asked them to describe (.) What's 
730. Greg like?
731. Greg: (1.9) Well I hope they'd say a loving person (.) A caring person
732. (.) That's what I would like to think and (.) I always used to 
733. think one of the attributes of my job (.) when I used to work 
734. (0.6) was having empathy for customers (0.6) and whatever 
735. (0.6) Certainly towards the end when you know (0.5) they 
736. were in really difficult situations (0.5) Erm but regardless even 
737. when (.) when you're lending people money if you're saying 
738. "No" (.) so empathy was always a word that was drawn into it 
739. and I always thought that was something I had when I worked 
740. as ((Job Title)) and you're working with teams and sales 
741. teams and things like that (0.6) I would always want them to 
742. feel that they could come to me and (0.6) It it was me as a 
743. person I would always try and sell (.) So I suppose it was 
744. always the person and that's why I say (.) I think I was like 
745. that even before (0.7) I think it's just more accentuated now
As in Extract 5.4, Greg first describes himself in terms of the type of person he is ("a loving 
person (.) A caring person") rather than roles. However, he then warrants this description of
what he hopes others would say about him by drawing on an attribute of his past 
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professional role and identity. Greg describes how "one of the attributes of my job" was 
"empathy" and explains how he displayed empathy both towards his customers and towards
his team. He draws on his former professional identity to warrant his construction of his 
current self. The dilemma of describing himself as being the same person yet also 
describing changes in attitude and motivation is negotiated by highlighting how "I think I 
was like that even before" and how "I think it's just more accentuated now". These 
assertions further add coherence to Greg's identity. The changes described earlier in Extract
5.4 are here negotiated as attributes of Greg's identity that have been present all along, 
only which are now more noticeable. Constructing his account in this way achieves 
coherence in Greg's identity.
Extracts 5.4 and 5.5 have illustrated how Greg negotiates the dilemma that arises when 
talking of himself as being the same person pre- and post-cancer while simultaneously 
describing changes in his attitudes and motivations between these two periods of his life. 
This dilemma relates to constructing a coherent identity within his account. Contradictions 
in the type of person he constructs himself to be pre- and post-cancer potentially undermine
his assertion that he was the same person before his illness as he is today. Greg draws on a
number of discursive techniques to manage this dilemma, such as making use of an 
extreme case formulation to construct his previous attitude as being how most people are 
and a feature of the world. His account is also rhetorically organised to undermine any 
challenges to the notion that he is still the same person, acknowledging that self-interest 
still constitutes a part of who he is today though it is now subjugate to his primary concern 
of "how other people feel and how you can help and things like that".
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Moving past the experience of cancer
I wish to make one final comment about the idea of being the same person after cancer. 
While for both Bernadette and Greg talk of being the same person involved negotiating 
ideological dilemmas, Deborah's account featured a very different discursive strategy for 
warranting her description as being the same person. This strategy involves constructing 
cancer as an episode that was now over. Within Deborah's account the experience of cancer
ended when her sister was also diagnosed with cancer:
89. Deborah: in June my sister was diagnosed with ovarian (1.1) So I sort of 
90.  like (1.3) I only had cancer for two months really ((laughs)) 
91.  because she (.) she (.) I mean it was very serious (.) She 
92.  survived it (.) She's OK (.) Erm but that sort of like took over 
93.  really 
(Interview 5:89-93)
At the end of the interview I asked Deborah if there was anything further that she wished to
say about her cancer experience to which she replied:
"Not really (2.8) It was just an episode (.) Just a (.) that I'd rather not repeat (.) but it 
wasn't that bad while I was going through it really"
(Interview 5:937-938)
Within Deborah's account cancer was a closed chapter in her life. While such a construction 
does not preclude describing herself as being a changed person there is, arguably, an 
implicit assumption that normal service has been resumed.
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Chapter summary
In this chapter I have illustrated different types of ideological dilemmas that arise when 
talking about being the same person after cancer. For Bernadette the dilemma was in 
describing herself as being the same person yet talking about how her experience of cancer 
had changed how she viewed the world and the subsequent influence of this new world view
on her identity as a mother. Of particular interest within Bernadette's account is her 
acknowledgment that the experience of cancer has changed how she views the world yet 
she does not talk of the experience changing who she is. Bernadette may be looking at the 
world "with different eyes" but they are still first and foremost the eyes of a mother. In 
other words, who she defines herself to be has not changed. Any changes are incorporated 
into this identity. For Greg the dilemma arises in constructing a coherent identity that does 
not contradict the changes in attitudes and motivations that he also described. A notable 
feature of Greg's account is a theme of positive changes that followed his cancer diagnosis 
and treatment. This could be interpreted as an example of benefit finding or attributing 
positive changes to a traumatic event such as being diagnosed with cancer (Davis, Nolen-
Hoeksema, and Larson, 1998). Benefit finding helps to mitigate negative consequences such
as threats to one's self-concept. For Deborah, the experience of cancer was constructed as 
an episode that was now over. Implicitly, she was still the same person she had been before
this interruption to her life.
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Chapter 6  Findings: Negotiating new identities
Introduction
In this chapter I focus on some of the discursive work that is undertaken in negotiating new
identities following cancer. Arguably all of the participants were renegotiating their identities
during our interviews, either in constructing post-cancer versions of their pre-cancer selves 
or in renegotiating themselves as being the same person in light of any challenges that their
diagnoses may have presented. I am not looking to identify discrete processes of identity 
construction. Rather, my focus is on different (though not necessarily discrete) actions that 
are achieved as part of the identity work that occurs in self-talk about one's cancer 
experience. Unlike the previous chapters all of the extracts come from the same participant,
Alan in Interview 1. I have chosen to focus on these extracts because they illustrate two 
key aspects of identity that I have yet to address. The first of these is the notion of 
embodied experience and how such experience may challenge how we construct ourselves 
in everyday talk. The second is how identities are constructed not only within a local 
interaction between speakers, but also within a wider political and cultural context. Whilst 
Alan was not unique in orienting his account towards talk of embodiment or the political 
context, I consider these aspects of his talk to be central to the identities that Alan 
constructs for himself. As such I have chosen to focus on them in detail.
Constructing the terms of the debate
Alan was diagnosed with a brain tumour aged 30, around two years before our interview. At
the time of his diagnosis Alan was told the tumour was benign and only discovered that it 
was malignant after travelling overseas for specialist treatment. Alan's account of his cancer
experience was initially oriented towards his misdiagnosis ("Well what happened to me, I 
got misdiagnosed quite a bit", Interview 1:7-8; "they knew it was cancerous all along", 
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Interview 1:149; "a different doctor in Britain (.) It'd have been different", Interview 1:195-
196). However, throughout his account Alan makes reference to the importance of work and
his personal ideology of working hard and paying your way. This is central to how Alan 
defines himself in talk of his pre-cancer life, and to the challenges that no longer being able 
to work in the construction industry presents to his identity. For example, in Extract 6.1 
Alan is chronicling when his symptoms began:
Extract 6.1, Interview 1
247.Alan: (1.5) Just started one day (.) I woke up with it and I actually 
248. carried on working
249. Michael: Right
250. Alan: I was (.) I was always brought up that you work (.) for (.) you 
251. work and you pay your way (.) If you want something nice you 
252. buy it out of working
253. Michael: [Yeah]
254. Alan: I mean nothing against anybody on benefits 'cause 
255. unfortunately I'm on that now (.) Can't help that (.) but (0.6) 
256. I've done (.) I've made certain choices with my life since (0.7) I
257. mean I volunteer for a charity (.) doing houses up for people in
258. need now (.) So I'm still (0.3) working in the construction 
259. industry which I was doing before
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Extract 6.1 begins with an example of what Horton-Salway calls 'constructing the terms of 
the debate' (2004:358). This passage is part of a sequence of talk in which Alan was 
comparing his own case with that of another patient treated at the same facilities, by the 
same medical team. Rather than limiting his comparison to talk of symptoms and 
treatment, he orients it towards work and benefits. The 'endogenous concern' (Wetherell, 
1998) within Alan's account, here, is with work and benefits. He describes how his 
symptoms "Just started one day (.) I woke up with it and I actually carried on working" 
(lines 247-248). Within this description working takes priority over concerns for one's 
health. Despite the symptoms appearing without warning they do not merit immediate 
investigation and missing work. Elsewhere in the interview Alan describes how "being ill's a 
weakness in a way in the building trade" (Interview 1:1074) and how illnesses such as 
coughs and colds or stomach trouble do not warrant time off ("You still go in (1.3) I mean it
doesn't matter if you're running back and forth to the toilet you're still in and you're still 
trying to get on 'cause otherwise (.) you could be off that job", (Interview 1:1078-1081). In
identity terms Alan is not only constructing an individual identity with this description but 
also a social identity, identifying himself as a member of a social group who view being ill as
"a weakness". This presents a challenge to Alan's identity since, unable to work, he is no 
longer eligible to claim membership of this group. His social identity is lost.
Alan warrants continuing to work in light of his symptoms when he describes his personal 
philosophy as being "you work and you pay your way" (lines 250-251). There are two 
features of this description that I wish to highlight. The first is how Alan attributes this 
philosophy to how he "was always brought up" (line 250). In identity terms this 
characterises Alan's philosophy not only as something he believes now, but as something he
has "always" lived by. In other words, his account is rhetorically constructed to imply that 
this it is not only a part of who he is now but also a part of who he has always been. This 
presents an unresolved challenge to Alan's identity, since he is no longer able to work due 
to the sequelae of his surgery. This identity challenge is not limited to Alan redefining 
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himself in terms of something other than his work. He also now finds himself unable to live 
the way he "was always brought up" (line 250), a philosophy that he has "always" used to 
define himself. Alan also finds himself on the other side of a dichotomy implicit within his 
philosophy, the dichotomy between those who "work and pay your way" and "anybody on 
benefits".
Austerity politics and benefit claimants
It is worth setting Alan's account in a social and political context here. The interview took 
place in early 2016 at a time when anyone seen not to be working hard was frequently 
demonised by both the Conservative Government and large sections of the mainstream 
media for not 'paying their way'. This shaming of those on benefits is neatly encapsulated in
a speech delivered to the 2013 Conservative party conference by George Osborne, the (at 
the time) Chancellor of the Exchequer. In it, Osborne posed the rhetorical question "Where 
is the fairness, we ask, for the shift-worker, leaving home in the dark hours of the morning, 
who looks up at the closed blinds of their next-door neighbour sleeping off a life on 
benefits?" (2013). The effect of such rhetoric is to place each of us under the scrutiny of 
each other, a Foucauldian form of discipline that arguably controls behaviour. Unless we are
seen to be working hard we are taking advantage of our shift-working neighbour. We are 
not paying our way. We are skiving while others are striving to get on. Elsewhere in the 
interview Alan orients his account towards this type of rhetoric, in particular towards his 
appearance and how he looked like he could (and should) be able to work ("'Cause to look 
at me you'd never know that's the worse thing", Interview 1:1466-1467; "I know (0.7) 
people here4 don't judge me (1.1) They don't think 'Oh bloody lazy git I'm not happy with 
that I'm slaving my guts out (0.7) and he sits around' (.) 'Cause they all know that I'm 
actually (.) that it's a genuine thing with me", Interview 1:1478-1481). Such talk supports 
4 Alan is referring to his neighbourhood when he says 'here'
85
my interpretation that differentiating himself from the stereotypical benefit claimants of 
political discourse was an endogenous concern within Alan's talk.
In line 254 of Extract 6.1 Alan orients his account towards "anybody on benefits". He makes
use of a discursive technique called a stake inoculation in order to defend the stance that he
is about to take in relation to being on benefits. Edwards and Potter (1992) highlighted how 
the particular construction of an account may lead to dilemmas of stake or interest. An 
account could be dismissed as being motivated by the self-interests of the speaker, by their 
prejudice against a particular group, or other motives that could serve to undermine the 
legitimacy of the account. As such the speaker may attempt to 'inoculate' their account 
against attempts to undermine it, prefacing the account with an explicit rejection of 
potential criticisms. For example, a criticism of immigrants might be prefaced with the stake
inoculation 'I'm not a racist but...'. In Alan's case he inoculates his stance towards people 
on benefits by saying that he has "nothing against anybody on benefits" (line 254). At stake
here is his own need to claim benefits, a situation that could see Alan accused of being 
hypocritical.
Alan differentiates himself from "anybody on benefits" in general, marking himself out as an
atypical case. He does this by describing his own situation of being on benefits as 
unfortunate, that he "can't help that" (line 255). This is dilemmatic, since the notion of 
"can't help that" is at odds with the agency inherent within individual responsibility for 
working and "you pay your way" (line 251) as well as the philosophy of "being ill's a 
weakness" (Interview 1:1074). Alan manages this particular dilemma by describing how 
"I've made certain choices with my life since" (line 256). Implicitly those same choices, and 
the agency to make them, are available to all people on benefits. In other words, while he 
himself "can't help that" the implication is that some other people can help being on 
benefits. Indeed elsewhere this is something that Alan explicitly expresses in relation to 
benefit claimants ("I've not been on benefits all me life like certain people have...Cause 
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there's a few out there who try to play it", Interview 1:565-568). Later in the interview Alan
further differentiates himself from others on benefits by describing how, unlike some, he 
has contributed to the benefits system and is entitled to the benefits that he now finds 
himself receiving ("You shouldn't be automatically (.) allowed to take take take...I paid for 
what I've took back", Interview 1:1596-1598). Alan's social context may have changed but 
to a large extent who he constructs himself to be, and the ideology he lives by, are 
unchanged. His belief in individual responsibility is still there ("I've made certain choices 
with my life since", line 256). The work ethic that was a part of how he defined himself pre-
cancer is also still present in how he defines himself now ("I volunteer for a charity (.) doing
houses up for people in need now", 6.1:257-258). Arguably his pre-cancer identity of a hard
worker, accepting responsibility for himself and expecting nothing without hard work, has 
been renegotiated in his new role as a volunteer builder. Or to use Alan's own words: "So 
I'm still (0.3) working in the construction industry which I was doing before" (lines 258-
259). 
Work roles as identity
The next extract further illustrates how Alan's working life was central to how he defined 
himself, and introduces a contrast that he draws between his pre-cancer identity and how 
he describes himself post-cancer. In Extract 6.2 I asked Alan how he would have described 
himself in the years before his diagnosis:
Extract 6.2, Interview 1
1088.Michael: If (.) If I'd asked that question 'Who are you?' (0.8) Ten years 
1089. ago or five years ago before you were
1090. Alan: [Builder] (.) [inaudible] there'd be Skilled Labourer (.) 
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1091. Supervisor (.) Finisher (0.8) I'd be listing off things that (.) 
1092. what's defined me 'cause I've done so many hours (1.2) I mean
1093. I'm a Dad as well I didn't mean that to be ((laugh)) (0.9) But 
1094. most the time now I just feel like a cancer patient when I'm 
1095. struggling on bad days I feel that way 
Here Alan defines himself in terms of the job titles that he has previously held, going as far 
as to describe these roles as "things that (.) what's defined me 'cause I've done so many 
hours" (lines 1091-1092). Alan's reference to having done "so many hours" was a topic that
he expanded on elsewhere in the interview, describing how working long hours meant that 
he had no time for a social life outside of work ("you can forget about seeing your mates 
and stuff when you're in construction", Interview 1:1528-1529; "Nobody will see you 
Saturday Sunday 'cause you spend all Saturday Sunday in bed recovering to get ready for 
the following week of doing it (3.2) So you don't really have time for many mates in 
construction", Interview 1:1544-1547). Unable to engage in paid work, Alan can no longer 
draw upon the roles that he describes as "things that (.) what's defined me" (lines 1091-
1092) to construct his identity. They can be drawn upon in defining who he used to be, but 
not in defining who he is now. Also changed are the people in relation to whom Alan's pre-
cancer identity was constructed. We define ourselves in interactions with other people and, 
as such, our identities are co-created by other people (Sparks and Harwood, 2008). For 
Alan the workmates that he previously spent his time working "so many hours" with ("Other
than your family they're the only people you're around 'cause you haven't got time for 
anybody else", Interview 1:1521-1522) are no longer there as a point of reference against 
which to define himself. Alan renegotiates his identity in relation to the people he now 
works with by incorporating his past work roles or "things...what's defined me" (lines 1091-
1092) into a new role of 'professional builder' volunteering with a charity ("I'm the first 
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person they've ever had who's professional", Interview 1:364; "I had to teach people who's 
in charge how to do the job", Interview 1:360). This provides continuity with the identity 
that Alan has always assumed. The "things...what's defined me" are still drawn upon to 
define him now, only as constituent parts of the role of 'professional builder' rather than the
trade specific labels that he previously drew upon ("[Builder] (.) [inaudible] there'd be 
Skilled Labourer (.) Supervisor (.) Finisher", lines 1090-1091).
Embodied experience and constructing a coherent identity
I now turn to another aspect of identity, that of embodiment. Howson described 
embodiment as "a dialectical process between embodied experience and the language 
available to articulate such an experience. Hence, the notion of embodiment refers to a 
process of transformation and mediation in which embodied experience is authentic and 
articulated through cultural categories" (1998:237).  In discursive terms these cultural 
categories are made available through discourses and can be drawn upon in everyday talk. 
What is of interest, and accentuated, within Alan's identity talk is the importance of his 
embodied experience in defining who he constructs himself to be. His pre-cancer life was 
one of an exhausting work schedule. In Alan's own words, "Nobody will see you Saturday 
Sunday 'cause you spend all Saturday Sunday in bed recovering to get ready for the 
following week of doing it" (Interview 1:1544-1546). Post-cancer, the effects of his tumour 
and brain surgery mean he can no longer work for a living let alone work at the same rate. 
In the following extracts I wish to explore how this change in Alan's embodied experience is 
negotiated in identity terms.
In Extract 6.3 Alan describes his frustration at not being able to put up a shelf, a process 
that he describes as being simple since it "is like six screws" (Interview 1:1050).
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Extract 6.3, Interview 1
1047. Alan: I used to have a shelf (0.7) before we put the new fireplace we 
1048. used to have a shelf above the old one (0.8) and (1.1) I think 
1049. that took me about (0.7) forty five minutes and hour (0.8) to 
1050. put a shelf up which is like six screws (0.9) Because I'm just 
1051. struggling to do it (.) I've no (.) no confidence in myself and I 
1052. just struggled and it's like now some days I can do things some
1053. days I can't (0.6) It (0.8) varies day to day (1.1) You get quite 
1054. angry (0.5) with yourself
1055. Michael: (1.1) Angry with yourself or angry with the
1056. Alan: [It's angry with yourself] that you're not 
1057. doing it right
1058. Michael: Right
1059. Alan: It's one of those "Why aren't I (.) why aren't I doing it right?" 
1060. I've done this hundreds of times why can't I do it today?
1061. Michael: (0.8) Even though you know
1062. Alan: [It is the tumour] but I'm angry with me
1063. Michael: Right
1064.Alan: Because it's like I'm better than this sort of
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Within this passage Alan resists the changes in his physical and cognitive (embodied) 
abilities, judging himself against his pre-cancer (healthy) self ("I've done this hundreds of 
times why can't I do it today?", line 1060). Despite acknowledging that "it is the tumour" 
(line 1062) he describes how he is "angry with me", emphasising the pronoun. He is not 
angry with the disease or the sequelae of his treatment. He is angry with "me", with 
himself. Alan then attributes the cause of his anger as being "because it's like I'm better 
than this sort of" (line 1064). Implicit within this judgement is the importance of embodied 
experience to Alan's identity. His declaration that "I'm better than this" conflates his skills 
(his embodied experience) with who he is. He does not say that he used to be able to 
accomplish the task much more easily before cancer, nor make a causal attribution that this
loss of expertise is due to having a brain tumour. His inability to perform a task that he has 
"done...hundreds of times" presents a challenge to who Alan has always constructed himself
to be, the person who is "better than this". While Alan is describing his post-cancer physical 
limitations he is doing so through the lens of his pre-cancer, healthy abilities. In doing so he
creates continuity with his pre-cancer identity.
Elsewhere in the interview, I asked Alan how he thought the people whom he used to work 
with would have described him before his illness. His answer focused on his abilities now, 
post-cancer, rather than the period I had asked him about. Alan described how "I was a 
grafter then and I can't graft as much now (0.9) So if I went to work with them now I'd be 
(.) called a lazy bastard" (Interview 1:1333-1334). Here he draws upon a category of 
'grafters', acknowledging that he "can't graft as much now". The implication is that he does,
however, still graft as much as he is able to do. He still belongs to that category of grafters, 
and still defines himself in relation to the other grafters that he used to work with. What 
interests me about this description is how Alan's account defines him in reference to his 
former work colleagues or his pre-cancer self, a definition which leaves him open to being 
"called a lazy bastard". Indeed these are not the words of his former colleagues, but of Alan
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himself. It is Alan's own judgement of himself, presented as the judgement of the people he
used to work with. He chooses to position himself within the category of 'grafters' rather 
than a category of disability or being physically or cognitively impaired  ("my brain doesn't 
want to work sometimes and I get confused doing things", Interview 1:1033-1034) either 
through illness in general or through cancer specifically. Again, constructing his account in 
this way creates a coherent identity for Alan. It serves as an 'anchor point' (Little et al, 
2002:173) or strongly held belief that Alan can orient towards as a method of negotiating 
the discontinuity of his pre- and post-cancer identities. He is still a grafter, albeit in a 
diminished capacity. He still lives by his philosophy of hard work, as far as his physical 
limitations allow. In Howson's terms, Alan is articulating his embodied experience through 
the same cultural categories that he draws upon to articulate his pre-cancer, healthy 
embodied experiences. 
The final extract of this chapter is from a sequence of talk in which Alan is describing how 
his cancer experience has changed him. In contrast to the benefit finding within Greg's talk 
in Chapter 5, Alan's focus is still on benefit claimants:
Extract 6.4, Interview 1
1548. Michael: (2.4) Would you say then that all (.) so far this experience (.) 
1549. it's probably a silly question but (.) would you say it's changed 
1550. you? And if it's changed you how's it changed you?
1551. Alan: I would (.) I don't think it has changed me that much (0.9) I'm 
1552. still the same inside still got the same ethics and that (.) A little
1553. bit of (0.9) towards people with benefits me views have 
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1554. changed slightly
1555. Michael: Right
1556. Alan: But then (.) there's still quite a lot of them that do (0.9) get to 
1557. me and they do peeve me off a bit (.) 'Cause their attitude's 
1558. that (0.8) "We've got a bad back so we need all this" (.) I've 
1559. not asked for anything (.) I don't want (0.5) to live on benefits 
1560. (0.9) I mean I'm not arguing (.) It's like we keep hearing about
1561. benefits cuts that this with the Tories I know it's a bit political 
1562. but (.) This affects me
1563. Michael: Yeah
1564. Alan: I'm genuine and none of this is affecting me ((laugh)) Nothing 
1565. so far that all this that (.) It's going to affect all the people 
1566. that's on (.) that's disabled all this (0.6) Not a single thing has 
1567. actually affected me yet
The feature of this passage that I wish to focus on is Alan's reference to disability and how 
he includes himself in that category. Alan describes how "a little bit of (0.9) towards people 
with benefits me views have changed slightly" (lines 1552-1554), the implication being that 
he has a more positive attitude towards people on benefits. This echoes his earlier 
description of how "I mean I've had to change me attitude a bit the sort of people I work 
with I didn't realise but (1.5) I always looked at people who was on benefits and think you 
know what you can't be arsed to work" (Interview 1:491-494). However, Alan adds the 
caveat that "there's still quite a lot them that do (0.9) get to me and they do peeve me off 
a bit" (lines 1556-1557). In warranting his attitude towards these individuals Alan orients 
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his account towards the political context of benefit cuts and the debate over the effect of 
such cuts on people with disabilities. He explicitly acknowledges how "This affects me" (line 
15620) before justifying being on benefits himself by describing how "I'm genuine and none
of this is affecting me" (line 1564).
This is similar to the identity work in Extract 6.1, where Alan marks himself out as a special 
case when it comes to being on benefits ("Can't help that (.) but (0.6) I've done (.) I've 
made certain choices with my life since", lines 255-256). What is different about this 
passage is Alan's implicit inclusion of himself within the category of 'disabled' ("it's going to 
affect all the people that's on (.) that's disabled all this (0.6) Not a single thing has actually 
affected me yet", lines 1563-1564). He acknowledges that "this affects me" (line 1560), 
that benefit cuts are "going to affect all the people that's on (.) that's disabled all this" (lines
1565-1566), yet also describes how "Not a single thing has actually affected me yet" (lines 
1566-1567). Alan orients his judgement of benefit cuts towards "all the people that's on (.) 
that's disabled" not towards people on benefits in general. The endogenous concern within 
his talk is with "people...that's disabled". More specifically, Alan's concern is with 
differentiating himself from people that he judges not to be genuinely disabled. In identity 
terms Alan situates himself within the category of disabled benefit claimants, but it is a 
category of genuinely disabled claimants. 
Chapter summary
In this chapter I have highlighted the interrelated nature of Alan's work and who he 
constructs himself to be, as well as giving examples of the often complex discursive work 
that he undertakes in renegotiating his identity. The need to renegotiate his identity not 
only arises from Alan no longer being able to work post-cancer, but also in relation to his 
having to claim benefits and the contrary position that this places him in regarding his 
personal ideology of working hard and paying your way. There is one final point that I would
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like to make about this chapter and my reasons for including these extracts. This is in 
regards to how Alan's renegotiation was as much about how he constructed his post-cancer 
(voluntary) work setting as about himself. This was possible since Alan was able to draw 
upon his professional skills (and past identity) in his voluntary role. However, in Extract 6.3,
when physical and cognitive impairment interfered with his ability to perform a task he had 
done "hundreds of times", Alan's frustration was explicit. The ambivalence towards disability
discussed in Extract 6.4 illustrates an ongoing 'process of transformation and mediation in 
which embodied experience is authentic and articulated through cultural categories' 
(Howson, 1998:237). What particularly interests me about Alan's account is the way that he
draws upon 'cultural categories' that are rarely cancer related. Instead he draws upon 
categories of grafters, "lazy bastards" and, on one occasion, disability.
Despite the seriousness of his prognosis, Alan's account was oriented towards warranting 
his need to claim benefits within the context of austerity Britain. The endogenous concern 
within his talk is not having an inoperable brain tumour or of being made acutely aware of 
the fleeting nature of life. Rather it is a concern with differentiating himself from other 
benefit claimants, with justifying being a benefit claimant himself. It is neither the aim, nor 
within the scope, of this thesis to offer a disquisition on current political discourses (for 
scholarly criticisms of austerity politics see Goodley, Lawthom, and Runswick-Cole, 2014 
and Runswick-Cole, Lawthom, and Goodley, 2016). However, the influence of such 
discourses on Alan's identity talk warrant the inclusion of the extracts used in this chapter. 
The dominant discourse within his account, and with which he constructs his identity, is not 
one of being a cancer patient. It may well be that Alan's focus on talk of benefit claimants 
and justification for not paying your way is a means to not have to talk about what his 
future may hold. Though, equally, it may well illustrate that even a diagnosis of cancer no 
longer warrants not paying your way in austerity Britain.
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Chapter 7  Discussion
Introduction
This thesis explored the research question of 'How do people construct themselves in talk 
about their experience of cancer?'. The focus has been on how individuals position 
themselves within our cultural discourses of what it means to be diagnosed with cancer, to 
be a cancer patient, and to be a cancer survivor. A consistent feature of all the accounts 
was that participants drew upon multiple discursive strategies to construct post-cancer 
identities that were consistent with their pre-cancer identities. All of the participants 
described themselves as being the same person they were before cancer even when, as in 
Margaret's case, this was unwanted (she did not want to be a widow). Often participants 
also described ways in which the experience of cancer had changed how they viewed the 
world or how it influenced their decision making. None of the participants identified as being
a cancer survivor. The only time this identity was called upon was in Bernadette's account, 
to explicitly reject being identified in such terms. For two of the participants, Alan and Greg,
cancer had resulted in them being unable to work. Before being diagnosed with cancer work
had been a significant part of their lives and who they considered themselves to be. Post-
cancer the influence on their identities of being unable to work was markedly different. In 
this chapter I discuss these findings in terms of how they relate to previous research.
7.1 Continuity of identity
A common feature within all the interviews was continuity of identity. Participants employed
numerous discursive strategies to construct themselves as being the same person pre- and 
post-cancer. Often this involved negotiating contradictions within their account to ensure 
coherence between the person they described themselves as being at different points within
the cancer experience. The contradictory nature of the identity talk of cancer patients has 
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previously been highlighted by Baker et al (2016). My own research differs from that of 
Baker et al in several ways. I will highlight these differences as they are important to 
demonstrating how my findings further contribute to our understanding of the identity 
challenges cancer survivors may face.
Baker et al (2016) noted how cancer patients often drew upon both their pre- and post-
diagnosis identities when interviewed about their emotional experiences post-diagnosis. 
They found that those closest to time of diagnosis tended towards maintaining continuity 
with their pre-cancer identities by maintaining pre-existing routines. Those unable to 
resume pre-cancer routines talked of 'new normals' discontinuous with their pre-diagnosis 
routines and identities. In contrast to the participants in Baker et al's study, all of the 
participants in the current research had completed treatment and were considered to be 
cancer free rather than yet to begin or be receiving treatment. Their time since diagnosis 
was also considerably longer (2-10 years) than the time since diagnosis for Baker et al's 
group (<18 months). This difference is important because it illustrates that even once 
treatment has been completed (in two instances up to 10 years prior to the interview) 
continuity of identity was still an endogenous concern within participants' talk. Just as 
importantly, analysis of the action orientation of talk of being the same person suggests 
that such talk is not exclusively directed towards what Little et al (2002) called existential 
disruption or a sense of continuous identity.
For two of the participants (Sarah and Bernadette) I would argue that talk of being the 
same person was oriented towards creating a sense of continuous identity. They had 
accommodated the experience of their illnesses into pre-cancer identities and, arguably, did
not define themselves explicitly in terms of having experienced cancer. However, for the 
other participants such talk achieved very different actions. For Greg it was used to defend 
his pre-cancer focus on self-interest and materialism, arguing that he had always been 
empathetic towards other people only less so pre-cancer. For Alan, talk of being the same 
97
person was a means to negotiate the threat presented to his social identity by finding 
himself on the other side of a dualism of grafters and benefit claimants. While the talk of 
being the same person employed by these participants could be described using the types 
of discontinuity identified by Little et al (2002), doing so solely in these terms risks ignoring 
the endogenous concerns of the individual. For example, Greg's description of himself as 
having always been empathetic towards other people could be interpreted as making use of 
what Little et al (2002) called an anchor point or enduring belief resilient to challenge. Yet 
by considering the action orientation of his account I have highlighted that this talk of being
the same person is also used to mitigate Greg's pre-cancer self-interest and materialism. 
Similarly, Alan's talk of being the same person could be described as making use of an 
anchor point and what Little et al (2002) called resumption or accommodating his pre-
cancer identity of a hard working builder into a new version of that identity as a hard 
working volunteer builder. Yet, once again, by considering the action orientation of Alan's 
account I have highlighted that talk of being the same person is also a means to 
differentiate him from other benefit claimants. In the case of Margaret's talk this can 
interpreted as an example of what Little et al (2002) called a loss of future memory or how 
she may have imagined her future self looking back on defining moments in her life such as 
the shared rewards of retirement after a lifetime of her and her husband's hard work. 
However, by examining the action orientation of her talk it is clear that she does not 
attribute talk of being the same person to her experience of cancer. In Margaret's case 
analysis of the action orientation of her talk of being the same person illustrates that she 
does not want continuity of identity. Whilst Little et al's (2002) research can provide an 
accurate description of where the discontinuity arises in Margaret's identity, a focus on the 
action orientation of this talk highlights that the discontinuity is not her concern. Her 
concern is with being a widow.
While Little et al have very eloquently described different challenges to continuity of identity
and various methods of dealing with those challenges, they (explicitly) assume personal 
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identity is made up of 'embodiment, continuity, and memory' (2002:171, emphasis in 
original). In contrast to Little et al's methodology, the methodology that I have adopted in 
this research seeks to situate these constructs within a sociocultural context. Focusing on 
the action orientation of talk has not only illustrated the social actions being achieved by 
such talk but also towards whom or what those actions are directed, whether that be myself
as interlocutor, a cultural positioning of benefit claimants as the opposite of hard workers, 
or a cultural expectation that life will become meaningful after surviving cancer. 
Although all of the participants described themselves as being the same person pre- and 
post-cancer, most also described ways in which the experience had changed how they 
viewed the world. In other words, the person stays the same while their beliefs or behaviour
may change. Implicitly there is a dualism here between the person and their behaviour. This
is a common sense understanding of the nature of our individual existence, that we are the 
sum of our experiences but essentially the same person, changing or growing as we get 
older (and hopefully becoming wiser). Analysis of the action orientation of the participants' 
accounts, in particular analysis of attributions, shows that in Bernadette's case changes in 
behaviour were indeed attributed to being older and wiser. This contrasts with our common 
sense understanding of cancer as a life changing event. What is not clear is why Bernadette 
should choose to attribute some (though not all) changes in behaviour or how she views the
world to the more prosaic process of growing older and wiser rather than to the experience 
of cancer. Defining herself in terms of more commonplace discourses may simply be a 
means of moving past the illness, though this would not account for why changes in beliefs 
or behaviour sometimes were attributed to the experience of cancer. Speculatively, 
attributing changes in behaviour and beliefs may also be a means of managing the 
expectations of others. The moral obligation to show a fighting spirit that Willig (2011) 
suggested follows a diagnosis of cancer also extends to the period of survivorship, with 
survivors expected to display perennial positivity and no longer be troubled by everyday 
tribulations (Cantrell and Conte, 2009). To attribute changes to cancer could potentially be 
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interpreted as dwelling on the illness. Miller (2015) has highlighted how the expectation that
an individual should be 'over' cancer can result in survivors communicating in terms of this 
expectation rather than in terms of their endogenous concerns. Attributions of being older 
and wiser may be an example of communicating in terms that manage the expectations of 
others that the survivor is over cancer. 
7.2 Survivor Identities
Another common feature of the accounts of all participants was the absence of talk of being 
a cancer survivor. Bernadette was the only participant to draw upon the term 'survivor', 
doing so explicitly to reject defining herself as such. Multiple reasons have been suggested 
for resisting the identity of cancer survivor (Khan et al, 2012a; Khan et al, 2012b; Miller, 
2015; Cho and Park, 2015; Jagielski et al, 2012). The first one that I wish to discuss in 
relation to the findings of this thesis is the lack of a socially validated discourse of 
survivorship on which participants could have drawn (Little et al, 2002). What it means to 
be a cancer survivor is contested both within our common sense understanding of the 
disease and within the accounts of those who have survived cancer. Without consensus on 
what it means to be a cancer survivor, survivors can 'fit only into pre-existent and 
inadequate paradigms of the normal or the chronically ill, into metaphors of the victim or 
the hero' (Little et al, 2002:176). In discursive terms it may be that as well as facilitating 
the construction of a coherent identity, and the social actions described earlier, a separate 
social action achieved by negotiating continuity of identity is that it allows one to fit into the 
'paradigm of the normal' post-cancer. In other words, it facilitates a return to the pre-
existing normality of one's pre-cancer self. What is not clear is whether the participants 
would have described themselves as a cancer survivor if different discourses of what it 
means to be a survivor were available to them. What is clear from the findings I have 
presented is that none of the participants oriented their accounts towards 'paradigms...of 
the chronically ill' or 'metaphors of the victim or the hero'. Had the interviews taken place 
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immediately following their diagnoses or during treatment this may not have been the case.
However, post-cancer participants defined themselves largely in terms of their pre-cancer 
identities. Given the pervasiveness of metaphors of heroic battles in everyday talk of cancer
this begs the question why the participants would not describe themselves as victorious, if 
not heroic. Once again analysis of the action orientation of their talk may offer some insight 
into why this could be, specifically when attributions of agency and accountability are 
examined. None of the participants constructed their accounts in terms of themselves being 
responsible for the successful treatment of their tumours. Responsibility for being free of 
cancer tended to be attributed to their treatment in general and occasionally explicitly to 
their doctors. In other words, the participants did not construct themselves as having 
played a part in becoming cancer free beyond accepting the treatments they were offered. 
Metaphors of heroic battles do not fit their accounts in terms of agency and accountability. 
They have not battled the disease (or the treatments) but rather have been passive 
recipients of medical treatment. While accountability for successful treatment was attributed
to the treatment or doctors, the participants described themselves as having the choice to 
go along with or reject these treatment option. This is incompatible with 'metaphors of the 
victim'. Similarly, 'paradigms...of the chronically ill' do not fit the situation of someone who 
has been declared cancer free or in remission. To construct oneself in such terms would be 
to continue to be identified in terms of cancer rather moving past it (Miller, 2015; Kahn et 
al, 2012a).
Metaphors of victims and heroes have received much criticism for the constraints that they 
place on cancer patients (McCartney, 2014; Hurley, 2014; Granger, 2014; Willig, 2011; 
Demmen et al, 2015; Semino et al, 2015; Ehrenreich, 2009; Hauser and Schwartz, 2015). 
Whilst I have highlighted the incompatibility of such metaphors with the agency and 
accountability identified within the talk of cancer survivors we should not assume that this is
the case for those still receiving cancer treatment. The one participant (Alan) who drew 
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upon the battle metaphor in his account is also the only participant to still describe himself 
as a cancer patient. This is one area that future research could look at. 
Moving past the experience of cancer
A further reason that has been suggested for resisting the survivor identity is that it ties one
to the experience of cancer (Miller, 2015). Within some of the accounts there was a degree 
of ambivalence about moving on completely from the experience of cancer. For Deborah, 
two years post-treatment, the experience was 'just an episode' tempered by the caveat that
she would rather not repeat it 'but it wasn't that bad while I was going through it really'. 
Bernadette spoke of approaching being 'signed off' after 5 years in remission. When asked 
to explain what being 'signed off' meant Bernadette described it as her doctor considering 
her situation to be 'that there's no more cancer' and that 'I'm done'. While they both clearly 
talked in terms of the experience being in the past or of being 'done', Deborah and 
Bernadette both also spoke of changes in how they viewed the world post-cancer. They 
each oriented their accounts towards a sense of urgency and not knowing what was around 
the corner. This was couched not in terms of fear of recurrence of the disease (another 
reason that Kahn et al, 2012a, have suggested for resisting the cancer survivor identity), 
but rather as something they described as motivating their decisions and behaviour. So 
while both accounts contained talk of moving past the experience of cancer, Deborah and 
Bernadette both accommodated changes attributed to cancer into their post-cancer 
identities. Similarly, Sarah spoke of how she still embraced the friendships that she had 
made during her cancer experience yet also how she had 'shut away' some parts of the 
experience in her mind, telling herself to 'just shut that away'. For these participants 
moving on from cancer did not mean totally disconnecting themselves from the experience. 
It would appear that moving on is not necessarily a binary choice, that individuals may 
assimilate aspects of their cancer experience, such as not putting off doing things, into their
post-cancer identities while still constructing themselves as largely the same person they 
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were before the illness. A common feature of the accounts of the three participants 
discussed above is that they were all able to resume the lives they had expected to live 
once treatment was completed. In contrast both Greg and Alan found themselves unable to 
resume their pre-cancer lives and faced the challenge of negotiating new identities outside 
of the work roles that had been large parts of their identities pre-cancer.
For Alan cancer was still very much a part of his identity. Although he was in remission his 
prognosis was that the tumour was expected start growing again within a specified time 
frame. While Miller (2015) and Kahn et al (2012a) both highlighted that the thought of 
recurrence was a reason that people resisted the survivor identity, for Alan recurrence was 
more of a certainty. Indeed Alan described himself as being a cancer patient. Greg resisted 
the identity of cancer survivor despite being heavily involved with cancer charities and NHS 
cancer teams in various voluntary roles. Ostensibly this could be interpreted as Greg being 
tied to his experience of cancer. However, when talking about these roles his descriptions 
were oriented towards the relationships he was able to form with healthcare professionals 
and both cancer and non-cancer patients. Rather than being tied to the experience of 
cancer I would argue that Greg had accommodated the experience into his post-cancer 
identity.
Margaret made little reference to her own cancer experience, instead being concerned with 
what had happened to her late husband and the lack of meaning she felt in her life as a 
widow.
There are two further brief points I wish to make in reference to none of the participants 
identifying as a cancer survivor. The first is that cultural differences in the acceptability of 
the term cancer survivor have previously been identified by Kahn et al (2012b). The British 
way is simply to keep calm and carry on. Participants of different nationalities, such as 
Americans, may have identified with the term cancer survivor (the term has its origins 
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there). The second point is regarding the local interaction of the interviews, with myself 
being a fellow cancer survivor. Previous researchers have suggested that people may resist 
identifying as a cancer survivor due to a sense of not having been close enough to death or 
having received harsh enough treatment (Cho and Park, 2015; Jagielski et al, 2012; Kahn 
et al, 2012a). Whilst all of the participants knew that I had been diagnosed and treated for 
cancer none of them knew what form that treatment had taken. In other words, 
constructing themselves as a survivor could potentially have been undermined by my own 
experience had I chosen to talk about it. Not identifying as a cancer survivor may have been
a means of managing this issue of stake or interest (Edwards and Potter, 1992).
7.3 Austerity politics and marginalisation
The last finding that I wish to discuss is the influence of discourses of austerity politics on 
the identities available to those unable to work after cancer. Austerity is the name given to 
the policies of the UK Coalition Government formed in 2010. These policies are centred on 
spending cuts ostensibly aimed at reducing the country's structural deficit. Critics of 
austerity have argued that the true aim of these spending cuts is to shrink the public sector 
and the welfare state (Runswick-Cole and Goodley, 2015). Austerity is founded upon the 
neoliberal ideology of individual responsibility for oneself and one's dependents. This 
responsibility extends beyond the financial realm as individuals are also morally accountable
for being seen to be playing their part and paying their way (Runswick-Cole, Lawthom, and 
Goodley, 2016). Goodley and Runswick-Cole (2015) have argued that the neoliberal agenda
depends upon the creation of categories of 'us' and 'them', the former being those citizens 
who accept their individual responsibilities and the latter the 'shirkers' and 'skivers' who do 
not. Within austerity Britain anyone claiming state benefits over the past seven years has 
become synonymous with this latter group. Benefit claimants have been demonised by large
sections of the UK media as well as becoming the subject of 'poverty porn' mainstream 
television programmes such as 'Benefits Street' (Channel 4 Television, 2014). The focus of 
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such programmes is the individual rather than any structural constraints that may have 
placed them in, or be preventing them escaping from, poverty. The implicit (and sometimes
explicit) message is that these individuals have nothing to blame for their predicament but 
their own fecklessness and idleness (Runswick-Cole and Goodley, 2015). 
Cancer not only entails long periods of being unable to work during treatment but also, as in
Alan's and Greg's cases, may result in being unable to work even after treatment has been 
completed. For the participants in this study treatment necessitated up to a year off work. 
Five of the six participants were either in employment that provided sick pay during their 
treatment, were covered by private insurance policies that included critical illness cover, or 
were retired. The exception was Alan who, as a self-employed builder, could be considered 
the archetype of the responsible citizen in austerity Britain. Before his cancer diagnosis Alan
was flexible in where and when he worked, accepting financial responsibility for himself and 
his family. Post-treatment, he was no longer able to work and was reliant on state benefits 
to support his family.
Alan's account in particular illustrates the identity constraints that discourses of austerity 
can place on cancer survivors. Rather than orienting his account towards the existential 
threat presented by cancer much of his identity work involved differentiating himself from 
other benefit claimants. Within the discourse of austerity you are either working and paying 
your part or taking advantage of the welfare state. The positive contribution that Alan 
continues to make as a volunteer builder working for a charity is not recognised within the 
discourse of austerity. Only paid work is recognised as contributing to society. The impact of
austerity and how it positions those outside the normative assumptions of what it means to 
be a responsible citizen has already begun to receive learned criticism (Runswick-Cole, 
Lawthom, and Goodley, 2016; Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2015). The findings from my 
analysis of Alan's account contribute to this nascent body of knowledge and contribute to 
being able 'to question, destabilize assumptions that marginalize and exclude bodies and 
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minds that are judged to fail to meet the expectations of ableist normativity' (Goodley and 
Runswick-Cole, 2015:11).
7.4 Methodological reflections
This thesis has drawn upon a methodology of Discursive Psychology, which re-
conceptualises psychological phenomena such as remembering, personality, and attitudes 
as performative acts that take place within spoken interaction. Participants' accounts were 
not analysed for their veracity to the events they describe or who participants 'really are'. 
Rather, they were analysed for the social actions that they achieved within the setting of the
interview. A caveat that needs to be applied to this methodology is that participants were 
talking postdictively about events that had occurred up to 10 years prior to their interview. 
Had the interviews taken place around the time of diagnosis or during treatment the 
accounts offered may have been very different. Equally, had the interviews taken place at a 
different point in my own cancer recovery (or had I never joined that ubiquitous club) my 
interpretation of the interviews, or how participants responded to my questions, may have 
been very different.
Characteristics of the sample
As well as the retrospective nature of the accounts, the positive (physical) prognosis of 
most participants should also be considered as influencing who they constructed themselves
to be. All of the participants were cancer free or in remission at the time of their interviews. 
As such the stance they take in the world may be very different to individuals with a 
terminal diagnosis or those facing a recurrence of cancer.
Half of the participants had experienced breast cancer. While this is the most common type 
of cancer in the UK (Maddams, Utley, and Møller, 2012) it has been argued that it holds its 
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own unique place amongst our common sense understanding of the disease (Ehrenreich, 
2009). This is not to say that the identity challenges faced by breast cancer patients differ 
from those diagnosed with other forms of the disease. Rather, to recognise that a more 
varied sample of participants may have highlighted different discourses of what it means to 
be a breast cancer patient versus a lung cancer or pancreatic cancer patient, which both 
have much lower survival rates than breast cancer. In turn this may have identified 
different identity challenges, particularly in relation to the culpability associated with 
smoking and lung cancer. Breast cancer is also commonly associated with being a disease 
experienced by women, even though 2,350 men were predicted to be diagnosed with, and 
440 men were predicted to die from, breast cancer in the United States in 2015 (Siegel, 
Miller, and Jemal, 2015). As such there are gendered assumptions about what it means to 
be a breast cancer patient.
Analysing identities in isolation and in context
Clegg Smith, Klassen, Coa, and Hannum (2016) have pointed out that much previous 
research has focused on cancer identity in isolation rather than within a broader context of 
who one considers oneself to be (cf. Park et al, 2009; Kahn et al, 2012a; Miller, 2015). This 
study differs from such research in two ways. First, its focus on participants' identities 
before, during, and after diagnosis and treatment rather than focusing solely on being a 
cancer patient or a cancer survivor. Being semi-structured in nature the interviews allowed 
participants the freedom to orient their accounts to what was important to them rather than
what was important to me as the researcher. While the participants were all volunteers to a 
research study about their cancer experiences, all of the interviews were replete with talk of
life outside of cancer. Such talk offers a glimpse into the social and political context in which
the accounts are set. For example, both Greg and Alan oriented their accounts of their 
cancer experiences towards key tenets of the discourse of austerity. In Greg's case this was 
to mitigate his pre-cancer pre-occupation with himself and material possessions, in Alan's 
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case to defend himself against criticism for not working and paying his way. I would argue 
that the chosen methodology's acknowledgement of the social and political context is a 
strength of this study. To ignore the context of people's talk is to ignore issues of power 
relations such as those that have given the discourse of austerity politics such prominence 
and continue to sustain it. Challenging the normative assumptions of political discourse (of 
any persuasion) and the constraints that it may place upon subjectivities requires 
challenging those power relations.
The second difference between this and much previous research lies in my own role within 
the research and particularly the interviews. The identities constructed by participants in 
their interviews can be considered to have been co-created in interaction with another 
cancer survivor (Sparks and Harwood, 2008). This may have been a benefit for participants,
engaging with someone with whom they share 'a frame of reference' (Miller, 2015) that 
allows them to share 'a knowledge that is hard to share with those who have not had similar
experience' (Little et al, 2002:176). Though, conversely, my own status as a cancer 
survivor may have led to some experiences going unsaid: a tacit understanding of a shared 
experience that does not need to be articulated. My own experience of cancer must also be 
acknowledged in my interpretations of the participants' talk. The motivation to undertake 
this research was as much to do with my own dissatisfaction with dominant discourses of 
cancer as it was with intellectual curiosity. As such there was always the danger that I was 
looking to confirm these dissatisfactions. However, by adopting a systematic and iterative 
process of analysis I have guarded against such self-confirmation.
7.5 Conclusion
This thesis has explored how people who have experienced cancer construct themselves 
within talk of that experience. A common feature of all accounts was continuity of identity or
constructing oneself as being the same person before and after cancer. Where this research 
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contributes to our understanding of the role of continuity of identity for cancer survivors is 
in its findings that are the result of a focus on the action orientation of talk. Talk of being 
the same person was not exclusively oriented towards dealing with existential disruption or 
the sense of being the same person. The findings presented in this thesis have illustrated 
how such talk may also be used to justify past behaviour or to renegotiate new social 
identities.
Given the absence of a culturally validated discourse of survivorship I have suggested that 
maintaining continuity of identity may be a means of returning to the pre-existing 
paradigms of the normal. Analysis of issues of agency and accountability within participants'
talk has highlighted the incompatibility of what Little et al (2002) called 'metaphors of the 
victim or hero' or 'paradigms of the chronically ill' with the identities participants 
constructed for themselves. I have also shown how the discourse of austerity politics may 
serve to constrain the identities available when an individual finds themselves unable to 
engage in paid work as a result of cancer.
Understanding the identity challenges of being a cancer survivor are important beyond 
intellectual curiosity. Past research (Miller, 2015) has shown that cancer survivors may 
compromise on communicating their own concerns in order to maintain consensus with 
those around them. Such compromises in communication can mean that cancer survivors 
do not receive support appropriate to the identity challenges of survivorship. By highlighting
some of the endogenous concerns of cancer survivors, and how those concerns may be 
contrary to our common sense understanding of cancer, this thesis hopefully makes a 
contribution towards achieving a common sense understanding of cancer that more 
accurately reflects the concerns of the individuals living with and after the disease.
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Appendix 1: Participant consent form
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Appendix 2: Information sheet
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Appendix 3: Interview guide
Allow participant to begin to tell their own story
Q: Tell me about your cancer diagnosis and the time leading up to it
Probe: General health? How did you manage any physical symptoms? How did you explain 
the symptoms to yourself and to other people?
Coping mechanisms and attitudes to overcoming adversity
Q: Thinking back to when you received your diagnosis, what were your first thoughts? 
Probe: Some people may immediately worry about death, some people may be more 
confident that they will survive. What was it like for you?
Q: Did you continue to have those thoughts as time went on, or did you notice a change in 
your thinking?
Probe: (If thoughts changed) How did your thoughts change over time? 
(If thoughts did not change) What do you think now? 
 
Self identity
Q: If I asked you 'who are you?' how would you describe yourself?
Q: Thinking back to before your cancer diagnosis, if you had been asked the same question 
what would you have said?
Q: If other people were asked those same questions – family, close friends, or work 
colleagues – how would they have describes you before cancer? How would they describe 
you now?
Probe: How would people say you've changed if at all? How do you feel about the way other
people view you now?
Private vs public face
Q: Did you tell people about your diagnosis? 
Probe: How did you approach telling people about your diagnosis? When asked or 
unprompted? Order of revelation/worries about telling people. Were there people you didn't 
tell?
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Q: What sort of reactions did you get from people when you told them? Can you give me a 
couple of examples of how people reacted?
Probe: Did people react the way you expected they would? Tell me about someone reacting 
differently to how you thought they would/What type of reaction did you find useful? What 
type of reactions did you find unhelpful and why? Did you avoid telling certain people 
because of how you thought they might react?
Treatment and enforced incapacity
Q: (If participant worked) How long were you off work? What was that like for you? How did
it make you feel?
Probe: Reaction of employer/financial difficulties/Ability to return to work and do old 
job/How long in their work role? How big a part of their life is their work?
Q: Tell me about how your treatment affected you
Probe: Being able to do the things that you used to do – work, family role, personal pursuits
Life after treatment
Q: Since completing your treatment are there any ways that your life is different?
Probe: Physical activities/attitude to life (urgency/re-prioritising what's important)/Are there
things you used to do that you no longer can?/ Do people treat you differently or do they 
assume that it's 'all over'?
Q: Since completing your treatment are any ways that your relationships are different?
Probe: With family? With friends? With work colleagues?
Q: Are there things that you miss about your life as it was before cancer? Are there things 
that you consider are now better since your experience of cancer?
Probe: Activities?
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Appendix 4: Online recruitment advert copy
My name is Michael Ruddy and I am carrying out a research study at the University of 
Huddersfield. I am looking for people who have completed initial cancer treatment to take 
part in an informal interview about their experience of cancer. This will include talking about
being diagnosed with cancer, undergoing and completing initial treatment, and being cancer
free or in remission. My interest in this area comes from being a cancer survivor myself.
The aim of the study is to examine the different ways that people react to their diagnosis. It
is also looking at any changes to people's lives while they are living through and after 
cancer. Interviews will be carried out at the University of Huddersfield Queensgate campus 
in the centre of Huddersfield or at a mutually convenient location.
The research has received the approval of the School of Human and Health Sciences Ethics 
Research Panel.
To find out more about the study please visit www.withthroughandbeyondcancer.com or email 
Michael.Ruddy@hud.ac.uk
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Appendix 5: Example of analysis coding
Identity Quotation Line(s) Action
Self-sufficient
"I was (.) I was 
always brought up 
that you work (.) for 
(.) you work and you 
pay your way (.) If 
you want something 
nice you buy it out of 
working"
244-246
Ideology/Stake
inoculation against
potential criticism that
he is claiming benefits
"I mean nothing 
against anybody on 
benefits 'cause 
unfortunately I'm on 
that now (.) Can't 
help that (.) but (0.6) 
I've done (.) I've 
made certain choices 
with my life since 
(0.7) I mean I 
volunteer for a charity
(.) doing houses up 
for people in need 
now (.) So I'm still 
(0.3) working in the 
construction industry 
which I was doing 
before"
248-252
Disclaimer followed by
category construction
to position himself
apart from the
populist category of
benefit
claimants/Ideological
dilemma
"I got scared to go out
(1.0) and closed me 
self away from the 
world (1.2) And I 
picked me self back 
up through 
volunteering (0.7) I 
went to one (.) charity
(.) and it was two 
buses to get there (.) 
it was too much for 
me (.) it was too 
much for me body"
332-335
Ideology
Category creation to
differentiate between
'me' and 'me body'
"Since coming back 
I've always had the 
attitude (.) I'm going 
to get back to work"
414-415
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